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The Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
was established by decision of the OECD Council on 23 October 1962 and comprises 24 member 
countries of the OECD: Austria, Belgium, Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In 
addition, the following non-OECD countries are members of the Development Centre: Brazil 
(since March 1994); India (February 2001); Romania (October 2004); Thailand (March 2005); 
South Africa (May 2006); Egypt and Viet Nam (March 2008); Colombia (July 2008); Indonesia 
(February 2009); Costa Rica, Mauritius, Morocco and Peru (March 2009), the Dominican Republic 
(November 2009), Senegal (February 2011), Argentina and Cape Verde (March 2011) and Panama 
(July 2013). The European Union also takes part in the Centre’s Governing Board.
The Development Centre, whose membership is open to both OECD and non-OECD countries, 
occupies a unique place within the OECD and in the international community. Members finance 
the Centre and serve on its Governing Board, which sets the biennial work programme and 
oversees its implementation.
The Centre links OECD members with developing and emerging economies and fosters debate 
and discussion to seek creative policy solutions to emerging global issues and development 
challenges. Participants in Centre events are invited in their personal capacity.
A small core of staff works with experts and institutions from the OECD and partner countries 
to fulfil the Centre’s work programme. The results are discussed in informal expert and policy 
dialogue meetings, and are published in a range of high-quality products for the research and 
policy communities. The Centre’s Study Series presents in-depth analyses of major development 
issues. Policy Briefs and Policy Insights summarise major conclusions for policy makers; Working 
Papers deal with the more technical aspects of the Centre’s work.
For an overview of the Centre’s activities, please see www.oecd.org/dev.
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EDITORIAL
Not a day goes by without a blog post or a newspaper article on what have become very 
popular terms: impact investing, venture, catalytic or strategic philanthropy, etc. This blossoming 
vocabulary refers to the use of private financial resources and business principles for public 
good. Although this trend emerged about a decade ago, the prominence of new ways to invest 
philanthropic capital are now well established and influencing the development “galaxy”. The 
recent economic crisis confirmed this trend further, with both high net worth individuals and well-
established as well as new foundations committing to funding development challenges using 
innovative tools and approaches such as impact investment, and marginally compensating for 
governments’ budget cuts in official development assistance (ODA).
The relevance of impact investment was acknowledged by G8 Leaders at their 2013 Summit, 
resulting in the creation of a G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce. These new approaches may 
have transformational implications for the world of philanthropy and provide important insights 
for the on-going debate on development finance.
The Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has been observing and following this movement with scrutiny, given the potential 
implications for developing countries; in fact, a large share of venture philanthropic flows and 
innovative business models target developing and emerging economies. 
The study Venture Philanthropy in Development: Dynamics, Challenges and Lessons in the 
Search for Greater Impact, undertaken by the newly created Global Network of Foundations 
Working for Development (netFWD), is a first step towards offering an in-depth insight on how 
foundations working for development are evolving in their search for greater impact. It looks at 
the journeys, enabling environment, incentives and drivers that led a number of philanthropic 
organisations willing to seek novel ways to address global development issues to (re)define their 
operating model. While they were once “grant-makers only”, considering allocated money gone 
for good, an increasing share of foundations are becoming real investors, i.e. expecting a financial 
return alongside social impact or at least seeking to recover their initial capital.
While we chose to focus on Venture Philanthropy for Development, defined here as “an 
entrepreneurial approach to philanthropy that combines a variety of financial and non-financial 
resources to identify, analyse, co-ordinate and support self-sustaining, systemic and scalable (for 
and not-for profit) solutions to development challenges aimed at achieving the greatest impact”, 
the report provides a broader overview of innovative ways to support development and to create 
shared value.
More specifically, this report offers insights into an innovative and cutting-edge development 
theme, which is becoming pivotal in the Post-2015 context and in discussions on financing 
for development. Beyond being an important contribution aimed at foundations envisioning a 
similar transformation towards venture philanthropy, its potential also lies in helping bridge the 
knowledge and cultural gap between foundations and governments. The latter often lack an in-
depth understanding of the philanthropic sector, its drivers, actors and influence. Bridging this 
is particularly timely, in light of the efforts that have taken place since the Accra and Busan High 
Level Fora to “enlarge the tent” of development co-operation to new actors and move from aid 
effectiveness to development effectiveness. In that sense, the Mexico Ministerial of April 2014 will 
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be a stepping stone, given that it will be the first time that foundations are invited to the table. The 
study and netFWD more broadly, confirm the role that the OECD Development Centre plays as 
convener and platform for policy dialogue between development stakeholders. 
I am confident that this report will trigger critical discussions and that it will also encourage 
development actors to deepen their collective efforts towards more effective development co-
operation.
Mario Pezzini 
Director, OECD Development Centre
EDITORIAL
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Aid agencies and development partners alike now recognise that private funders and investors, 
including foundations, are an important and growing part of the global development architecture. 
In 2011, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation specifically identified 
philanthropic organisations as significant partners in the development process. The global 
economic crisis and cuts to official development assistance (ODA) associated with its redirecting 
from low-income to middle-income countries opened up new opportunities for foundations 
providing mostly grants, unlike official donors increasingly using loans.
From their perspective, philanthropists have long been present in the development arena with 
more “patient” and “business-like” approaches. Driven by a desire to achieve greater impact, 
an increasing number of philanthropists have started to experiment with novel methods and set 
bolder ambitions for themselves to achieve impact on a scale proportionate to the development 
issues. They often bring expertise from the business sector in their approaches to problem 
solving, operating models and theories of change. These innovative philanthropists have, in 
particular, been seeking to achieve tangible development outcomes by leveraging financial and 
non-financial resources, and by being more interested in results and impact than inputs and 
grant size. They are often agnostic about the type of organisations they work with, engaging with 
a diversity of social purpose organisations (SPOs) that include for-profit enterprises as much as 
charities or NGOs. Rather than focusing on the traditional grant-giver/grantee relationship, these 
innovative philanthropists take a more dynamic and hands-on approach; partnering, providing 
capacity building and developing management expertise within the organisations they support.
This report reviews the experience of 
members of the OECD Global Network 
of Foundations Working for Development 
(netFWD) in adopting aspects of these 
approaches, summarised for convenience 
here as Venture Philanthropy (VP). It seeks 
to distil and disseminate the rationale, 
organisational implications and perceived 
benefits of the changes some foundations 
have undertaken. Four members of 
netFWD were interviewed in depth as the basis for this report and shared detailed case studies 
including their methods of assessing impact.
A mid-course re-direction
The foundations that participated in this OECD netFWD study all experienced a clear 
dissatisfaction with the impact of their grant-making methods, prompting them to embark on 
a journey of experimentation with and adoption of new models of philanthropy. The foundation 
leaders interviewed are confident that there is substantial improvement in the social impact of 
their programmes as a result of the adoption of such new approaches. Yet, they also admit that 
the transformation required can be lengthy and challenging, and that quantifying the improvement 
in results is difficult. This study reports on the experiences of these foundations and the lessons 
they have learnt and are still learning, and puts forward suggestions and recommendations for 
other foundations that are considering a similar mid-course re-direction. Detailed case studies 
“We realised that what we were doing 
wasn’t working… It wasn’t just around 
a particular challenge or a particular 
geography but it was not working for 




from four foundations provide insight into their modus operandi, ranging from what constitutes 
effective SPO partnerships to the impact obtained and the methods of evaluation which were used.
Whilst the name the foundations give to their approaches differs – angel philanthropy, 
enterprise philanthropy, catalytic philanthropy, and most commonly venture philanthropy – the 
principles underlining them are broadly similar. Comparisons between venture philanthropy (VP) 
and venture capital (VC) models have been made in the literature, but for the foundations, the 
differences between VP and VC are as numerous as their similarities. Although both share an 
emphasis on high engagement with their investment portfolio, periods of investment are longer 
for “venture philanthropy foundations”, often up to 7-10 years. Whereas in VCs only a quarter to 
a third of investments typically “succeed”,1 VP foundations aspire to much higher success rates 
(though in this case categorising success in terms of social benefit in addition to financial return). 
These foundations employ non-financial support in areas such as technical assistance, market 
development and the development of core capability (e.g. through the provision of unrestricted 
funding), along with financial instruments such as smart subsidy, guarantees and soft loans. 
Rather than the clear-cut exit strategies associated with venture capitalists, the foundations 
interviewed were more likely to smoothly transition relationships with their SPOs over time, 
retaining an interest in them or their sector and in some cases taking a seat on their Boards. 
Foundations seeking impact as a primary development goal see the private sector (markets 
and enterprises) as a vital route to scale social benefits, recognising that the complex problems 
they are endeavouring to solve (e.g. food security, provision of basic services such as health, 
or better jobs for youth), can be sustainably addressed through an increased focus on market 
creation, business thinking and commercial finance. They work systemically at policy and market 
levels to nurture the enabling environments that allow such enterprise-based solutions to flourish. 
Hence, their portfolios reflect such interests, with actors drawn from across disciplines to 
work on them. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, has convened scientists, urban planners, 
policy makers and international corporations to address urban climate change vulnerability in Asia, 
funding and staffing the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network to foster co-operation 
and the co-design of strategies. Shell Foundation, in addition to providing management expertise, 
grants and loan guarantees to its clean cook-stoves partner, Envirofit, has implemented indoor 
air pollution awareness campaigns and co-founded the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves.
Sectoral convergence
The blurring of sector boundaries is not 
without its critics. The entry of financial 
and business jargon into the development 
lexicon is seen by some as a “hegemonic 
hijacking” of the development agenda or 
even as exclusionary tactics to promote 
business at the expense of the extreme 
poor. The foundations and most of the 
specialists participating in this research, 
however, stress the need for these more systemic strategies and point to the “revolutionary” 
power of initiatives such as microfinance and mobile health2 to show what can be achieved by 
mobilising cross-sector resources. They also stress that enterprise/venture philanthropy can only 
be one option in a portfolio of possible interventions. Nevertheless, they see a role for VP, at times 
“We use our flexibility to create fit for 
purpose capital structures and that includes 
grants… Anyone who believes there is a 
market-based solution for everything is 
simply lost. Particularly in places like South 
Sudan or the Congo there is a critical need 
for grants, especially at early stages”
Stephen Nairne, Managing Director
Lundin Foundation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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filling the gap that “traditional” development assistance leaves behind, for instance helping to 
create or support a more viable private sector and, as a result, a more stable tax base.
Plotting the four case study foundations on the European Venture Philanthropy Association 
(EVPA)’s “continuum of social investment” (below) highlights the broadening out of intervention 
options to include market-based solutions and the use of flexible finance to pursue these more 
integrative strategies.
“Blended” societal and financial value



















































is to create 
societal value
Primary driver 
is to create 
financial value
Source: EVPA, 2013.
Current state Future ambition
Figure 3. Venture philanthropy in context
By deploying “the highest risk capital in the world” to test and prove business models or 
provide patient capital to support expansion, the foundations can “prime the pump” to attract 
mainstream and impact finance to the development sector. However, being effective in such a 
landscape demands concerted co-operation with other development actors and the collaborative 
mobilisation of resources to achieve the necessary impact at scale.
A fundamental cultural transformation
Achieving lasting and meaningful 
collaboration or partnerships between 
philanthropists and providers of ODA 
is not simple though, and was too often 
described by interviewees as being 
“bureaucratic, costly and ineffectual”. 
Foundations have not typically been known for prioritising collaborative efforts, either with 
ODA providers or even with each other, given their high degrees of autonomy.3 In some cases, 
the levels of transparency, accountability and synergy required to enable large-scale systemic 
engagement between venture philanthropists and bilateral donors have been and may continue 
to prove too challenging with too few incentives to change. As a result, when these collaborative 
“You can’t just write cheques for 
$50m without giving some thought to 
accountability, impact, where the money  
is going. You have to think about what the 
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efforts do take place, they are more often the result of political will from specific foundations or 
philanthropic leaders than the outcome of a perceived need or pressure to improve efficiency and 
impact through broader alliances between foundations and ODA providers.
Within philanthropic organisations, when such changes do occur, they may be quite radical, 
involving a complete re-imagining of purpose and redesign of strategy and operations. As showed 
by this study, the transition has been more dramatic in some foundations than others. Yet, despite 
the great diversity in size, maturity and focus of the foundations looked at in this study, common 
themes do emerge.
Effecting transformational change
As the foundations moved from input to output focus, so did their strategic framing, from 
grant-giving towards more targeted investment. Their scale of intervention broadened to become 
more sector and systems-level focused, working simultaneously at levels of start-up enterprise, 
market stimulation and policy intervention. By taking a “systems thinking approach” and investing 
more heavily in upfront research in order to investigate development issues in depth, foundations 
were able to determine which strengths they could most usefully deploy (e.g. reputation in the 
health sector), where to place capital to achieve greatest leverage and how to orchestrate more 
integrated interventions.
This approach has prompted a more specialised focus on fewer development issues. Because 
the “high engagement model” involves providing technical knowledge as well as management 
capacity to SPOs, the foundations realised they needed staff more specialised in the new areas 
of focus. The study shows that staff numbers often increased as a way to address new needs to 
support the SPOs’ management, technical and capacity building capability. In some instances, 
as with the Rockefeller Foundation and Lundin Foundation, new field offices were opened to 
allow foundation staff to be based closer to their SPOs. Culturally, the more “partnership-based” 
relationship with social enterprises plus the infusion of more business-oriented attitudes from the 
private sector into the foundations has fostered more entrepreneurial thinking, with an emphasis 
on innovation, results and returns. 
The key dimensions of change are captured below:
Dimension From Towards 
1 Strategic framing Widespread giving (traditional resource 
transfer)
Targeted investing (resources targeted in new 
ways)
2 Scale of intervention Project-based Systems or sector based and focused
3 Sector focus Third (charity or not-for-profit) sector Sector agnostic
4 Funding mechanisms Grants Blended finance (grants, soft loans, equity 
investment etc.) 
5 Engagement style Minimal (light touch) Foundation supplying partner with technical and 
management assistance and capacity building 
6 Engagement period Short (e.g. 1-2 years) Long (5-10 years or more)
7 Culture and capability of staff Altruistic, administrative, financial Innovative, multi-disciplinary, commercial
8 Success criteria Inputs and outputs Outcomes and impact
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Determining impact
All the foundations expressed the 
importance of achieving “impact” and 
believe the methods they use today achieve 
far more than short-term, ad hoc grant-
making had done for their beneficiaries. Yet, due to the methods they use, working systemically 
with and through multiple actors, they acknowledge that evaluating impact is challenging, and 
making comparisons between old and new models even more so. 
The Emirates Foundation, for example, only has “input” data prior to adopting VP as a new 
model (i.e. data on the size and placements of grants). They now collect data on indicators 
such as number of hours of voluntary service or number of social inclusion placements on their 
financial literacy courses. Their aspiration is to put figures on the social and financial value of their 
activities, and they are building a baseline to do so. 
By investing more heavily upfront in 
research and prototyping, it is possible 
to identify proxy indicators for assessing 
impact. For example, the Rockefeller 
Foundation identified the creation of 
urban climate change resilience (UCCR) 
strategies as a highly visible indicator of city 
planning for climate change adaptation, 
and now collect data on inclusion of UCCR as a topic in policy discussions and decision making 
at the city and state level. They cannot directly attribute outcomes to the interventions they have 
made through the network, but are confident that they have played a part. 
Impact measurement and evaluation of outcomes is a concern for all the case study foundations 
and for the sector at large. More resources are being invested to improve the assessment 
processes, yet this sometimes remains limited. Conversely, there is increasing recognition that 
evaluation must be used to help deliver better outcomes and to avoid “doing harm” (unintended 
consequences). 
The next phase of VP in development – A collective endeavour
Increasingly, foundations have the resources and ambition to design and sustain broad social 
change across a range of development issues. However, the central lesson from this study is 
that to achieve their potential, in scale and impact, foundations, as stewards of the “highest risk 
capital in the world”, must be willing to let go some of their autonomy to work more cohesively with 
partners across sectors and disciplines. Furthermore, becoming more prominent in influence and 
reach means becoming more visible publicly; therefore more liable to demands for transparency 
and clearer governance and accountability. 
This shift towards more openness and collaboration will require considerable change at the 
level of mindset and organisational culture in the foundation sector. But as the foundations here 
testify, the improvements in efficiency, results and therefore returns make the transformational 
work worthwhile.
“Looking for before/after comparative data 
is like comparing apples and oranges”
Stephen Nairne, Managing Director
Lundin Foundation
“Impact is above the accountability line – 
we’ll measure and look and assess and hope 
we were a significant contributor but we 
can’t know for sure”
Nancy Macpherson, VP Evaluation
The Rockefeller Foundation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Lessons and recommendations
The key lessons and associated recommendations from the multi-year journeys of change that 
each foundation has undertaken are summarised below:
Lesson and recommendation summary
Lesson Recommendation 
Being prepared to embark on fundamental and 
comprehensive change of the foundation’s model – 
ranging from beliefs, values to strategy and operations
Undertake a complete review that includes the deep assumptions underlying 
the current philanthropic operating model and theory of change.
Be willing to question deeply held beliefs and customs 
Not waiting for change to be imposed from outside 
– there is insufficient external scrutiny or incentives 
for change in the philanthropic sector
Use internal changes, such as leaders’ transition to gain new stewardship, 
prompt reviews and increase internal accountability. 
Plan for comprehensive change but start with small experiments to 
promote learning if stewardship is slow to appear
Applying “systems thinking” and planning based on 
more upfront investment in research and evidence-
based inputs
Consider investing more in ex ante research to target investments 
and interventions more accurately, and produce an evidence base for 
evaluation later on
Including the “market-based approach” more 
systematically to achieve scale and to aim for SPO 
self-sufficiency
Add market-based approaches to interventions but be aware that not all 
challenges will warrant a market-based solution; targeted grants are still 
an essential funding tool. Intervention at policy and market level may also 
be required simultaneously
Adopting a “high engagement” approach means 
being prepared to engage more financial and human 
resources (i.e. hiring more area specialists) 
Review the foundation’s competencies and capacity when considering 
change. Specialisation, outsourcing, recruiting and training offer different 
routes to meeting future requirements
Being adaptive and staying close to field partners – 
entrepreneurial SPOs demand responsiveness and 
real-time interaction
Consciously manage the tensions between size, bureaucracy of 
supporting projects while keeping enough flexibility to allow the 
foundation to offer appropriate and dynamic support
Increasing risk tolerance, long-termism and patient 
capital
Be prepared to take more risk at an earlier stage, while aiming for longer-
term and systems-level support. “Reframe” failure as a way of learning 
and of experimenting, and as an input into the learning curve of change
“Planning the divorce with the wedding” 
(endogenising exit strategies) 
Develop and review measures of success (qualitative and quantitative) 
that will trigger exit and maintain sustainability for grantees/SPOs
Working with other development actors, especially 
governments in the field and ODA providers is 
pivotal
Take a more proactive position in the development arena and be both 
willing to collaborate and to share the glory  and the innovation with 
others while taking into account other actors’ constraints
Learning and collaborating with peers to advance the 
impact of the foundation sector for development 
Commit to greater disclosure of lessons learned, either publicly through 
publication or privately in peer group forums. Integrate this with research 
and evaluation activity
This is by no means an exhaustive list but rather captures some of the most challenging 
learning for the foundations who shared their experience.
Conclusion
The study finds that Venture Philanthropy for foundations working in development does not 
constitute a coherent, easily defined operating model or strategic approach. Rather it has become 
more of a blanket term, an expression of a more purpose-, results- and responsibility-driven 
worldview. It incorporates a diverse set of principles aimed at increasing the reach, scale and 
social benefit of foundation resources. Such principles include much closer “high engagement” 
relationships between foundation and social purpose organisations, more strategic and targeted 
funding choices based on research and evidence building, a more encompassing view of 
foundation resources and a willingness to partner based on potential for results and scale rather 
than structural or constitutional type. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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As such, the challenges in adopting the VP model are not inconsequential. The capabilities 
required to successfully achieve the transformation may be only partially present or missing 
entirely in the foundation at the outset. The inclusion of more commercial and enterprise strategies 
in the foundation portfolio, especially with for-profit social enterprises, may raise cultural and 
ideological as well as constitutional concerns. An honest appraisal of the current “state of play” to 
identify strengths to leverage and barriers to overcome before embarking on adopting the model 
is a prerequisite in deciding if it is suitable and choosing where to start. 
The experience of the participating foundations, however, is that taking such a transformational 
journey is worthwhile. Although verifiable comparative field data is limited at present, foundation 
staff point to a variety of signals to showcase the value of the approach in engaging other actors 
to achieve leverage such as the attraction of more mainstream capital to scale social solutions. 
The study has raised a number of questions and areas for potential further research. Most 
critically, it highlights the need for greater inquiry, collaboration and co-learning both between 
foundations themselves and between foundations and other groups such as impact investors, 
commercial enterprise and the ODA community. The potential to leverage the philanthropic high 
risk capital is already considerable, but becomes far more so when economies of scale and the 
timely sharing of learning for continuous improvement are achieved. Further research to uncover 
good practice examples of cross-sector collaboration will help move the philanthropic sector 
forward. This would encourage a deeper appreciation of the goals and methods of such diverse 
actors. It would also enable dialogue between them in ways that overcome some of the suspicion 
and unhelpful assumptions that persist. In the meantime, the continued pursuit of “impact” in 
philanthropy and participation in networks will likely further accountability, transparency and co-
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is growing recognition from official aid agencies that private funders and investors, 
including foundations, are an important part of the global development architecture. In 2011, the 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation for the first time identified philanthropy 
as a significant partner in the development process. 
At the same time, new leaders are entering the philanthropic world with novel methods and 
bolder expectations. Their approaches to problem solving, theories of change and operating 
models mark a departure from traditional philanthropic giving. They draw on experience from 
commercial enterprise and seek scalable outcomes through the mobilisation and leveraging of 
financial and non-financial resources. 
These philanthropists are open-minded about the organisations and institutions they work 
with, whether for- or not-for-profits, and are willing to use a wider array of strategies, commercial 
and non-commercial, to address development issues. They build partnerships, work across 
multiple sectors and take greater interest in outcomes and impact than in inputs and grant size. 
Their new approaches have attracted a variety of names – angel philanthropy, enterprise 
philanthropy, catalytic philanthropy and venture philanthropy* – with the differences between 
them being more semantic than operational. What the approaches share are operating principles 
of high engagement with beneficiaries (also known as partners, investees or social purpose 
organisations – SPOs*) and a willingness to combine a variety of financial and non-financial 
disciplines. Some go further, adding creative interventions at policy and market levels to generate 
the market conditions in which their beneficiaries can thrive. 
This report reviews the experience of members of the OECD Global Network of Foundations 
Working for Development (netFWD) in adopting aspects of these approaches, summarised for 
convenience here as Venture Philanthropy (VP). It seeks to distil and disseminate the rationale, 
organisational implications and perceived benefits of the changes these foundations have 
undertaken. 
OECD established netFWD with key aims including optimising and accelerating the impact of 
philanthropy for development through the sharing of experiences and lessons, policy influence 
and the development of innovative partnerships. The network was launched by the OECD 
Development Centre in October 2012 and is a small group of self-selected foundations organised 
around two working groups: Enterprise Philanthropy (EP) and Innovative Thematic Philanthropy 
(ITP). The Enterprise Philanthropy Working Group consists of foundations that have each 
undertaken internal reform in order to enhance the effectiveness of their philanthropic approach. 
Four members of netFWD were interviewed in depth as the basis for this report and shared 
detailed case studies including their methods of assessing impact: the Emirates Foundation for 
Youth Development, Lundin Foundation, 
The Rockefeller Foundation and Shell 
Foundation. Another three, Novartis 
Foundation for Sustainable Development, 
JPMorgan Chase Foundation and the 
Edmond de Rothschild Foundations, 
reviewed the findings and shared further 
examples from their own experience. 
These philanthropists are open-minded 
about the organisations and institutions 
they work with, whether for- or not-for-
profits, and are willing to use a wider 
array of strategies, commercial and non-
commercial, to address development issues.
*See glossary for definitions of all terms marked with a *.
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All of the foundations consulted can be described as being on a “transformational journey”, 
experimenting in very different ways with the principles of Venture Philanthropy. Some are further 
down the road than others.
Each of them sees merit in adopting aspects of the VP model and believes they are more effective 
and have greater “impact” as a result. Some, such as Shell Foundation and Lundin Foundation, 
are making market-based solutions a central plank in their investment portfolio. Others, such as 
the Edmond de Rothschild Foundations and the Rockefeller Foundation, include such enterprise 
solutions within a wider portfolio of interventions. All have asserted the importance of working 
at multiple levels simultaneously – locally with social enterprises and beneficiaries, regionally at 
subnational level, and at the national policy level in order to develop the enabling infrastructure 
that sustains and scales solutions.
Whilst the benefit of adopting VP principles is evident to the foundations themselves and to their 
beneficiaries or SPOs that contributed case studies, longitudinal (year on year) data on impact at 
scale is still limited at this time. As discussed below (see Section IV, Determining Impact), this is 
due to factors including the complex and systemic nature of investments and programmes making 
attribution difficult (e.g. Rockefeller’s Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network programme 
which convenes actors at city and regional level), the relatively early stage of the programmes 
(e.g. Emirates Foundation’s new Financial Literacy programme) or the challenge of comparing 
“apples and oranges” between old and new approaches (as with Lundin Foundation). Each of 
the case study foundations, however, is investing in rigorously measuring their impact against 
predetermined Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)* and most are using third party assessment 
to test and verify results. In some instances “logical frameworks”* are utilised to translate a 
high-level strategic intent and theory of change* into a coherent portfolio of interventions with 
outcome-focused KPIs (see cases in Annex I). 
Reading this report 
This report is aimed at organisations, particularly foundations, seeking to increase impact and 
scale in the field of development. It is not written for venture philanthropy specialists. The hope is 
that by reading it, other foundations will be encouraged to examine the effectiveness of their own 
approaches, to share reflections and lessons with others, and to consider, where appropriate, 
applying similar techniques to enhance the impact of philanthropy more widely. It is also hoped 
that by digging beneath the surface of this emerging model of philanthropy, official aid donors 
and development finance institutions will gain a better understanding of how to interact with 
innovative foundations working for development.
The report is constructed around three connected topics. Firstly (Section II), it questions what 
Venture Philanthropy for foundations is and how the model is emerging in relation to official aid 
and development finance. Secondly (Section III), it demarcates how Venture Philanthropy is 
different to more traditional philanthropic models, along a number of core strategic dimensions 
such as scale, engagement size and how impact is measured (Section IV). Finally (Section V), 
it offers some lessons and recommendations from the contributing foundations which may be 
useful to other institutions considering a model shift or an adaptation of their approaches to 
effective development co-operation. 
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Introducing the foundations 
Case study foundations
Emirates Foundation for Youth Development
A semi-public foundation (co-funded by both the public and private sector) based in Abu 
Dhabi and operating across the United Arab Emirates (UAE), established in April 2005 by His 
Highness General Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and 
Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
The foundation
•	 Has a mission to improve the welfare of people across the UEA through public-private 
initiatives, modified in 2012 to focus solely on youth development, using the model of venture 
philanthropy.
•	 In addition to funding from sovereign wealth, attracts funding from private sector organisations 
wishing to invest in social projects as part of their corporate social responsibility within the 
UAE.
•	 Spent AED 157 m (USD 42 m) in 2012.
•	 Funds six youth development programmes, which it manages in-house. The programmes 
cover financial literacy, support for youth from disadvantaged communities, leadership 
and soft skills to prepare youth for work in the private sector and volunteering programs to 
encourage community engagement.
•	 Has 100 full time equivalent staff.
•	 Does not generate financial returns from its programmes but has an ambition to transition 
each of the six programs into a financially viable social enterprise.
Achieving impact
Since the foundation started tracking organisation-wide impact, by the end of 2012, it had 
engaged with 31 664 UAE youth with 10 187 having participated directly in a specific programme. 
By year end 2013, the foundation had engaged directly with over 63 000 young people in the UAE 
representing over 15% of its total target audience.
Lundin Foundation
A private foundation based in Vancouver, Canada established in 2005 by the Lundin family and 
co-funded by a number of Canadian natural resource firms and brokerages. 
The foundation
•	 Provides long-term capital and technical assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to support scalable and market-based solutions to environmental and social 
challenges.
•	 Uses a combination of impact investments and corporate social responsibility initiatives to 
support 30 initiatives in 17 countries around the world.
•	 In 2012 had an impact investment portfolio of USD 13.13 m (USD 5.16 m invested in 2012) 
and a corporate social responsibility initiative portfolio of USD 2.26 m.
•	 Currently generates an annual financial return of roughly 10% on its impact investment 
portfolio.
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•	 Has priority focus areas including access to energy, financial inclusion and smallholder 
agriculture each of which have been selected because of their demonstrable linkages to 
benefiting those living near to or at the bottom of the pyramid.
•	 Has seven full-time equivalent staff.
•	 Measures its impacts across five variables: financial sustainability, direct employment and 
wealth creation, product and service impact, contribution to local economies and catalytic 
influence or the way in which the foundation’s work has encouraged additional benefits to 
take place.
Achieving impact
In 2012 the social purpose organisations in which Lundin Foundation invested generated 
USD 38 m in revenue, hired over 1 200 employees and paid over USD 1.4 m in wages, did business 
with over 54 000 rural farmers and microenterprises and enabled over 449 000 rural clients to 
gain access to improved agricultural products, equipment, financial services and renewable 
energy devices. 
The Rockefeller Foundation
A private foundation headquartered in New York, established in 1913, with an endowment from 
John D. Rockefeller and a mission to improve the well-being of humanity around the world.
The foundation
•	 Disbursed grants (and undertook direct charitable activities) totalling USD 142 m (USD 182 m 
inclusive of costs) in 2011.
•	 Supports a number of interconnected grant-based initiatives globally covering four related 
issues, each of which is time bound and outcome focused. The issue areas are called: 
revalue ecosystems; advance health; secure livelihoods; and transform cities.
•	 Has 100 full-time equivalent staff.
•	 Does not generate financial returns from its grant-based initiatives.
•	 Has a small-scale (USD 23.9 m) parallel portfolio of programme-related investments, in 
operation since the 1990s and now managed through intermediaries. Financial instruments 
include debt (44.4%), guarantees (12.5%) and equity (44.4%). 
Achieving impact
The foundation does not aggregate impact achieved at the organisational level. Typically 
initiative evaluation includes aspects such as findings and lessons, outputs, outcomes, impact, 
policy influence, efficiency of financial and human resource and governance. 
Shell Foundation
An independent charity based in London, established in 2000 by Shell Group. Its mission is 
to identify, co-create and scale enterprise-based solutions in order to tackle global development 
challenges in a way that is ultimately sustainable.
The foundation
•	 Provides patient grant finance (disbursed USD 19 m in 2012), business skills and links to 
markets to support pioneer social enterprises and SPOs to demonstrate new models, to 
build capacity to operate at scale and to enable the growth of new inclusive markets.
•	 Focuses on five programmes to tackle major global issues: job creation through the SME 
sector, sustainable mobility in developing world cities, sustainability of agricultural supply 
chains, access to affordable modern energy products and services, and cleaner cookstoves 
for low-income communities.
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•	 Has 13 full-time equivalent staff.
•	 Does not generate financial returns from its grants but targets the financial sustainability of 
its partners.
•	 Maintains partner-wide key specific performance indicators and impact data which is 
aggregated into four organisation-level KPIs: sustainable (permanent) jobs created or 
maintained; number of livelihoods improved; reduction in tonnes of CO2 emitted; and 
“leverage”, the volume of US dollars invested by third parties in partners or as direct funding 
for activities and organisations supported by Shell Foundation with clear evidence of a link 
between Shell Foundation involvement and the leveraged funds.
Achieving impact
Shell Foundation now has several long-term partners that are achieving large-scale impact 
across Asia, Africa and Latin America. From inception to April 2013, Shell Foundation through 
its partners has helped create or maintain 22 779 jobs, improved 11.75m sustainable livelihoods, 
made carbon dioxide reductions of 3.86m tonnes and leveraged USD 3.78 bn.
Contributing foundations 
The Edmond de Rothschild Foundations
A network of private family foundations based in Switzerland, France, Spain, the US and Israel 
established between 1905 and 2005 by various members of the Rothschild family. The mission of 
this philanthropic network is to “promote inclusion, social empowerment and a more collaborative 
society.” 
The foundations
•	 Made total grants/investments in 2012 of approximately USD 20 m. Funds are drawn from 
the foundations’ endowments.
•	 Are active in education, health, the arts and social entrepreneurship. In-house social 
entrepreneurship programmes include Scale Up (training and professional coaching for 
social entrepreneurs) and the Ariane de Rothschild Fellowship.
•	 Also collaborate with partners including UnLtd India and the Acumen Fund’s Regional 
Fellows Programs, which provide financial and non-financial support to social entrepreneurs 
in developing regions.
•	 Number of staff: 10.
•	 Do not seek a financial return, but do require fulfilment of pre-defined objectives and impact 
reporting.
•	 Employ due diligence and oversight as a traditional investor would and share an investor’s 
goal of perennial financial solvability and autonomy in the structures supported.
Achieving impact 
Indicators vary across sectors and are tailored to respond to the goals and impact sought. 
Preference is not to aggregate but track indicators for projects over time, e.g. money granted, 
subsequent money raised from third-party grantors or investors (buy-in from other funders or 
capacity to self-finance), number of clients, laureates or patients benefiting from foundations’ 
grants or supported programmes, year-to-year ratios (ideally one dollar goes further each year).
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JPMorgan Chase Foundation 
An affiliate of JPMorgan Chase & Co, it does not distinguish between its corporate philanthropy 
investment and its foundation. 
•	 Provided over USD 190 m in grants to non-profit organisations across 37 countries in 2012.
•	 Priority areas fall under the pillars of economic development, financial empowerment and 
workforce readiness, ensuring that its grants respond to the needs of the communities in 
which it works. 
•	 Aims to support charities and programmes that have a clear social impact and the potential 
to be sustainable solutions to social problems.
Achieving impact 
The foundation in Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) has used third party analysts to 
assess the impact of its programmes against identified criteria including project sustainability 
and effectiveness of J.P. Morgan funding, as interpreted by its grantees. 
Indicators collated show that between 2011 and 2012, J.P. Morgan’s funding in EMEA impacted 
the lives of over 80 000 people; 91% of the projects supported continued beyond the life of 
J.P. Morgan funding; 88% of grantees in EMEA believe that J.P. Morgan funding helped their 
organisations increase their overall impact.
novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development
Established 30 years ago as a corporate foundation, the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable 
Development is primarily engaged as a competence centre for corporate responsibility and 
international health, focused on underserved communities. 
The foundation
•	 Had a budget of CHF 10m (USD 11 m) in 2012, of which CHF 6.8m (USD 7.4 m) was allocated 
to healthcare projects and CHF 1m (USD 1.1 m) to think tank and networking activities.
•	 Aims to improve access to healthcare, strengthen human resources in health and empower 
vulnerable groups.
•	 Fosters dialogue and networking, acting as a bridge between the private sector, international 
organisations, governments and NGOs.
•	 Employs performance-based funding and leverages the capacity of the parent organisation 
to provide financial and technical assistance for implementation of the health initiatives it 
supports. In 2012 these included projects in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia related to leprosy, 
malaria and child and maternal health. 
Achieving impact
Indicators are tracked at the project level. Examples include programmes such as ACCESS 
(2003-11), aimed at analysing and improving access to effective malaria treatment and care 
in Tanzania, in particular for pregnant women and children under five years of age through a 
combination of supply- and demand-side interventions. The final evaluation of ACCESS showed 
an increase in the number of patients treated with a recommended antimalarial from 36% in 2008 
to 62% in 2011. The results indicate that child mortality caused by malaria declined from 25 to 20 
per 1000 children. ACCESS interventions are calculated to have saved approximately 400 lives 
annually in an intervention area that has a population of 500 000.
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Methodology
Interviews with netFWD members form the basis of this report, with supporting data from 
annual reports and third party impact evaluation literature. Additional source material was 
drawn from published records, reports and interviews with subject matter specialists (see 
Acknowledgements: Key Contributors). For each case study foundation, interviews were 
undertaken with senior managers. Interviews were also undertaken with actors involved more 
closely in specific projects to provide additional inputs into the case studies. These included 
foundation project and programme managers, and in the case of Shell Foundation and 
Lundin Foundation, the CEO and senior management of beneficiary organisations of Envirofit 
(www.envirofit.org) and Comaco (www.itswild.org). In addition to external review, the collated 
findings were shared with netFWD members and associated observers in a facilitated workshop 
held in September 2013 to test hypotheses and consolidate lessons.
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The changing development context 
Shifting aid allocations
In the last decade, philanthropy has taken a more prominent role in the global debate about 
financing for development. Bilateral and multilateral official aid agencies are exploring partnerships 
with philanthropic foundations, impact investors and businesses with a renewed urgency.
This upsurge of interest is, in part, driven by the economic recession in the Global North. 
With government budgets under pressure, concerns around the role and impact of official 
development assistance (ODA), mixed results in achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) (especially in “fragile states”) and the innovative approaches taken by foundations such 
as venture philanthropy, foundations have become important stakeholders in the “development 
galaxy”. This has been reinforced by the realisation on the part of traditional donors that aid 
should first and foremost be an “enabler” of other sources and forms of support, coupled with 
the growing need to identify new forms of development financing. Indeed, since 2010, ODA has 
fallen by 6% in real terms. Between 2011 and 2012, bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa fell by 
7.9% and the share of ODA to the least-developed countries (LDCs) by 12.8%. Unsurprisingly, the 
OECD observes that the largest cuts to ODA were from those Eurozone countries impacted most 
by recessionary factors.
A new bottom billion
OECD data suggests that ODA (which in 2011 amounted to USD 161 bn) is shifting away 
from least developed countries (LDCs) to middle-income countries (MICs). This shift in portfolio 
allocation has opened debates about where ODA should be directed: to the poorest countries or 
to the poorest people based in LDCs, low-income countries (LICs) or MICs alike. For example, 
2013 witnessed the UK committing to end direct aid to the middle-income economies of India and 
South Africa by 2015. As low-income countries become middle-income countries and nations like 
India become donors in their own right, the end of such aid agreements could mean the poorest 
are left behind. Where two decades ago 93% of the billion poorest globally lived in LDCs, now 75% 
live in MICs (Sumner, 2010). With not everyone benefiting equally from economic growth and with 
rising expectations from the Global North to MICs to address their own social protection needs, 
this remaining quarter of a billion people could fall out of the reach of the official global donor 
community while not being covered by domestic support systems either. Trickledown economic 
growth is not proving sufficient to address such inequality, prompting institutions such as the 
World Bank to respond with an explicit focus on “shared prosperity” interventions that ensure the 
progress of the poorest 40% in each society. These interventions include a combination of job 
creation (public and private) and targeted policy interventions (Basu, 2013). 
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Increased private giving
In parallel, funding available from private global philanthropy to address issues like poverty 
and climate change is growing. This is attributed to a number of factors: a continued transfer of 
wealth into private hands; the shifting roles of the state, the market and civil society in addressing 
social issues; broader globalisation trends such as the growth of multinational corporations and 
corporate philanthropy; and the growing visibility of high-profile philanthropic leaders (Johnson, 
2010). The Hudson Institute Centre for Global Philanthropy (CGP) reports that US foundations 
together with other philanthropists gave USD 39 bn to development issues in 2010, an almost 
4% increase on the previous year. Of this giving, 53% went to health and medical services. 
However it is important to note that these figures are biased by the amounts provided by the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation and by the top five biggest philanthropic givers. The majority of 
other philanthropic organisations have rather limited financial resources. Overall, CGP reports 
that 23 developed countries gave a total of USD 55.9 bn to development through private giving in 
the same year (Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances, 2012). 
Such figures are still dwarfed, though, by the total of net private flows. These represent, 
including foreign direct investment, USD 358 bn in 2011 (OECD), highlighting the ever-more 
important role of private sector finance and the potential leverage that cross-sector co-operation 
could achieve. The relationship between foundation capital and the broader impact investment 
market is thus worthy of attention.
Priming the impact investors 
The growing prominence of philanthropic giving has, in some ways, been fuelled by increasing 
support for impact investment. The latter is also referred to as “social finance”, “social impact 
investing”, “blended value investing” or “impact finance” (Martin, 2013). With 24% of European 
Venture Philanthropy Association (EVPA) members calling themselves impact investors, it seems 
the field of venture philanthropy is also changing with more attention towards new financing 
vehicles aimed at generating both social and financial returns. The Global Impact Investing 
Network (GIIN) defines impact investments as investments made into companies, organisations 
and funds with the intention of generating measurable social and environmental impact, alongside 
financial return. But this shift also comes with its limitations such as risk aversion for below-
market returns investments. In January 2013, J.P. Morgan and GIIN published a survey of 99 
impact investors with individual portfolios of over USD 10 m and total investments estimated 
at USD 9 bn for 2013 (GIIN & JP Morgan, 2013). Interestingly, nearly two-thirds of respondents 
targeted full market rate returns on their investments, rather than choosing to accept lower 
financial returns and social impact; respondents subsequently complained that there were not 
enough high quality investment opportunities available (and only 18% of respondents invest at 
the seed/start-up stage). Sector opportunities in emerging markets primarily targeted food and 
agriculture, followed by financial services and microfinance. 
Impact investors are now being urged to think more systemically, long-term and consider lower 
rates of return. In 2012, Omidyar Network’s Bannick and Goldman authored a report, Priming the 
Pump, which called for impact investors to take a more catalytic view of the sectors in which they 
invest and to pay attention to policy enablers and blockers. Investment is encouraged at an earlier 
stage in the growth of organisations and in entities that are less likely to deliver risk adjusted 
returns directly, but which will enable the growth of entire sectors and markets to achieve scale. 
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Impact investors have been divided into “financial-first” and “impact-first” investors to describe 
the motivational criteria of the capital providers and, whilst Bannick and Goldman’s request may 
provide a call to arms for impact first investors (as it has to the foundations in this report), those 
prioritising financial return are unlikely to respond. Plugging the funding and sector level gaps 
and working to catalyse less attractive sectors could arguably be a role for foundations and 
philanthropy and attract more mainstream finance to development. 
Growing interest in impact investing is also coming from government and instruments such 
as Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) and Development Impact Bonds (DIBs), for example, are being 
seen as a means to direct private financial flows towards development needs. In 2013 the UK 
Prime Minister launched the Social Impact Investment Taskforce to build a global community 
of impact investors and drive standardisation through the use of common impact measures.4 
The SIB methodology relies on verifiable data to determine the success of the initiative and 
involves upfront funding from private investors that are reimbursed with a return by government 
when successful. Examples include bonds funding preventive social causes such as reducing 
recidivism in the UK. The question is whether the methodology can be translated to highly 
complex developing country environments where attribution is challenging. However, such 
schemes leveraging private sector and institutional funds are already blurring the lines between 
mainstream, impact and philanthropy social investment.
The limits of private giving 
In spite of the diversification and surge in interest in forms of innovative private giving, 
philanthropy cannot substitute ODA nor meet its shortfalls, as Figure 1 suggests. Although few 
statistics exist on foundations’ financial contribution to development, this figure tends to show 
that it is rather limited (6%) in the flows from DAC donors to developing countries, compared to 
ODA (27%). This is partly due to their limited financial resources, but also because foundations and 
private funders cherish their autonomy and choose to fund agendas aligned with their particular 
interests and/or expertise. Articles of a 
foundation charter may also limit where 
funds are directed. 
There appears to be a low willingness 
amongst foundations to invest time and 
resources in lengthy interactions with the official aid community. Rather they seem to prefer to 
use research to define best practices and trial experiments to determine where to deploy funds. 
Working outside of the constraints of accountability to domestic taxpayers, these organisations 
can develop innovative investment vehicles more quickly (e.g. combinations of subsidy, soft 
loans, equity-like instruments), experiment with programmatic interventions (such as the 
Emirates Foundation’s Social Inclusion programme5), learn from experience and be bolder in 
deploying high risk capital in ways that are not possible for official development finance. The 
foundations are protective of these capacities. Thus closer collaboration between them and 
ODA actors will need to take them into account, recognising them as complementary rather 
than replacing ODA. 
In spite of the diversification and surge in 
interest in forms of innovative private giving, 
philanthropy cannot substitute ODA nor 
meet its shortfalls.
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Official development assistance (ODA) Private flows at market terms, including foreign direct investment (FDI)









Figure 1. Total net resource flows from DAC donors to developing countries 2012 
(net disbursements in USD billion)
Source: DAC statistics.
A new approach to problem solving?
Though most development actors are likely to be driven by a similar set of goals and motivations 
such as contributing to eradicating extreme poverty, their approaches, theories of change, 
and operating models may be notably different. Dr Susan Raymond, the Executive 
Vice President of Changing Our World6 offers a useful model to illustrate the evolution of different 
approaches to giving, driven mainly by newcomers to the field.



















2. Teach a man 
to fish
3. Assess fish market 
and provide technical 
assistance for fishing 
net business plan
4. Provide a 
programme related 




investing in a for 
profit fishing net 
business
Figure 2. The philanthropic “arc of innovation”
Source: Raymond, 2012.
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Raymond’s “Arc of Innovation” (Figure 2) shows, perhaps simplistically, the breadth of the 
field in which donors (public and private) now operate and need to operate in order to scale 
up sustainable solutions. The day-to-day reality of what the foundations in this report do 
encompasses the entire spectrum of the continuum above, though with the conscious intent 
to move upwards from “traditional resource transfer” (give a man a fish) towards generating 
impact at scale. Their individual goals and methods will determine where on the continuum they 
direct their efforts. In some cases, the explicit ambition of the foundation is to create investible 
enterprise solutions (such as with Lundin Foundation) for others “using philanthropic resources 
in new ways” is being prioritised (such as the Edmond de Rothschild Foundations’ educational 
programmes). Foundations are still equally likely to be providing grants or giving technical 
assistance to outcome-focused programmes or to be providing, guaranteeing or fundraising for 
commercial grade finance to invest in for-profit social enterprises. 
A blurring of boundaries and 
convergence of approaches
With new actors moving into delivering 
social impact, there is a blurring and 
convergence of approaches. It matters 
less whether the recipient of funds is a 
non-profit entity or a for-profit social enterprise. It matters more that they have the ability or 
potential to create long-lasting solutions to development challenges. The social enterprise 
trend (i.e. businesses delivering against social objectives) is now recognised and enshrined in 
the US with the establishment of Benefit-Corporations and in the UK with Community Interest 
Companies. The trend however is a global phenomenon. 
The foundations in this report are experimenting with and applying novel practices from other 
sectors rather than sticking to conventional methods or incremental adjustments. Rockefeller 
now applies strategic marketing planning methods to identifying social issues to address. The 
Lundin Foundation is funding development and application of smartphone technology to impact 
assessment.
A convergence of approaches is also occurring from the commercial sector with large multi-
nationals working closely with NGOs and suppliers to strengthen their supply chains and reach 
new customers. These multi-nationals are excited by the potential at the “base of the pyramid”* 
(Prahalad, 2006) and corporations such as Unilever and Proctor and Gamble are developing 
business models and engaging with social enterprises to directly serve the extreme poor. The 
traditional provinces of philanthropy – healthcare, nutrition, hygiene, education – are now targets 
for corporate investment that achieve co-benefits to reduce poverty and alleviate associated 
problems. This concept of “shared value”, where prosperity is generated for society and not 
just for business, has been popularised through the Harvard Business Review and is finding 
increasing usage in the corporate boardroom (Porter & Kramer, 2006). 
The middle ground then between impact-first and financial-first organisations is becoming 
increasingly muddy, providing fertile soil to germinate new operating models which support for-
profit social purpose organisations. Some interviewees, including from the Lundin Foundation 
and the Novartis Foundation, echo Emerson, Brest and others (2013), in criticising the notion 
of impact-first or financial-first as a false dichotomy. They see it as too simplistic and too static, 
suggesting that every investment’s priorities vary over its lifetime, so that what begins with a 
finance-first orientation may ultimately mature to deliver greater social good. 
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lasting solutions to development challenges.
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Moreover this blurring and convergence 
is not seen by all as positive. One NGO 
representative interviewed expressed 
concern about the “hegemonic hijacking” 
of the development agenda, seeing 
powerful resource-rich elites appropriating 
the development field to maximise their 
own profits, with the website Business Fights Poverty referenced as a case in point. Another NGO 
member was suspicious of the “fashion” for business and financial jargon amongst foundations 
and impact investors, worrying that it was highly exclusionary of the very populations it was 
intended to serve. Some feel that the “Copernican Revolution” that foundations and impact 
investors sometimes feel they have introduced in the development field is somewhat exaggerated. 
Regardless of the magnitude of change, which might be too soon to assess, much can be learnt 
through these new models and the practices that are emerging. What is required, the interviews 
suggest, is to remain open and empathetic to the different perspectives and worldviews emerging 
while maintaining a critical eye to the potential for unintended consequences. 
A new breed of philanthropic leader?
In concert with these trends, a new breed of socially-driven solutions-focused leaders is 
emerging (Raymond, 2012; Elkington and Hartigan, 2008). These “Venture Philanthropists” 
support for-profit or not-for-profit entities without being wedded to a particular organisational 
form and combine grant giving with commercial grade investments. They draw on experience 
and knowledge from business to identify clear desired outcomes with smart objectives. They 
seek to mobilise resources as efficiently as possible to achieve those ends. Innovation – finding 
smarter, more efficient and impact-raising technologies and processes – is core to their modus 
operandi. A number of these leaders have come from dotcom and tech sectors (Osberg, 2006) 
and bring a love of technology with them. Such innovation will often include deploying non-
financial resources – business management skills, financial and commercial acumen, market 
analysis – to social purpose organisations. They seek partnerships that leverage their resources 
and in some instances (as Shell Foundation and Emirates Foundation here exemplify) they seek 
self-sufficiency (“spin off”) as a long-term objective for the SPOs they fund. This suggests that 
the individuals driving change may influence shifts in the development sector more than new 
theories of change or models themselves. 
With the focus more on creatively combining and leveraging resources and capital than 
on writing cheques, these leaders are willing to adapt and employ a vast array of resources, 
knowledge, skills and financial mechanisms to meet their objectives. This is mirrored in Figure 3 
produced by the EVPA which, although placing emphasis on financial structures, shows how so-
called “Venture Philanthropists” span the entire spectrum of charitable grant giving through to 
investing in profit distributing socially driven business. Given this wide range, perhaps the most 
important leadership attributes of these individuals are the abilities to learn and question, innovate, 
collaborate and consequently adapt and flex with the emerging needs of their programmes and 
initiatives. 
The four case study organisations have been added to the diagram to illustrate their direction 
of travel, towards a more encompassing range of options (e.g. from grantmaking alone towards 
grantmaking plus social investment). 
This blurring and convergence between 
impact-first and financial-first organisations 
is not seen by all as positive. Some express 
concern about the “hegemonic hijacking”  
of the development agenda.
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“Blended” societal and financial value
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Source: EVPA, 2013.
Current state Future ambition
Figure 3. Venture philanthropy in context
What is venture philanthropy?
“Private foundations often are established to engage in what has been described as “venture 
philanthropy”, or the imaginative pursuit of less conventional charitable purposes than those 
normally undertaken by established public charitable organisations.”
John D Rockefeller III, 1969
When the term “venture philanthropy” was coined by Rockefeller III in 1969,7 it was more 
closely affiliated with foundations taking an “adventurous approach to funding unpopular social 
causes” (John, 2006) than with the literal translation of (then nascent) venture capital principles 
to philanthropy. 
An evolving practice
Today, venture philanthropy (VP) 
may be best thought of as an evolving 
practice of the application of aspects of 
venture capital or business practice to 
the undertaking of philanthropy. Brest and 
Harvey (2008) argue that the approach 
simply constitutes good effective 
philanthropy practice and may amount to no more than a new generation of philanthropists 
modernising the approach. For John (2006) it is “more an evolution than the revolution it first 
When the term “venture philanthropy” was 
coined by Rockefeller III in 1969,7 it was 
more closely affiliated with foundations 
taking an “adventurous approach to funding 
unpopular social causes” (John, 2006) than 
with the literal translation of (then nascent) 
venture capital principles to philanthropy.
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appeared to be”. As such, formulating an exact definition for venture philanthropy could restrict 
further evolution and so may be counterproductive. Rather, and what the foundations interviewed 
best typify, is a continuing evolution, a willingness to try out new approaches and to learn from 
them, in ways that defy strict codification. 
Conceptually, the idea of venture philanthropy found popular expression in 1997 with the 
publication of a Harvard Business Review article, “Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can 
Learn from Venture Capitalists” (Letts, Ryan and Grossman, 1997). The article recommended 
that philanthropists should consider utilising venture capitalist tools such as risk management, 
performance management, relationship management and exit strategies in order to have a greater 
impact in addressing societal problems. 
Developing the concept further, the Morino Institute in 2001 defined venture philanthropy as 
“the process of adapting strategic investment management practices to the non-profit sector to 
build organisations able to generate high social rates of return on their investment… this approach 
is modelled after the high end of venture capital investors” (John, 2006, p. 9).
Other terms have become prominent in the last decade. Bishop and Green (2008) coined 
the term “philanthrocapitalism” to describe the emerging VP or catalytic philanthropy model, 
exploring the strategies of a particular class of successful market-savvy philanthropists led by 
Bill Gates and Warren Buffet who are “trying to apply the secrets behind their money-making 
success to their giving”. 
Helping to put venture philanthropy into a broader landscape of investment and engagement, 
Emerson et al. (2007) plot venture philanthropy and venture capital together (Figure 4). They 
illustrate how both pratices emphasise the role of engagement (high involvement strategies) 
between investor and investee and the importance of the non-financial often managerial support 
that both deploy. 
Source: Emerson et al., 2007.
HIGH INVOLVEMENT
Venture philanthropy Venture capital
Traditional grant-making Bank lending
LOW INVOLVEMENT
COMMERCIALCHARITABLE
Figure 4. The involvement profit matrix
Since 1997 the influence that venture philanthropy has had on foundation giving is thought to 
be more conceptual than practical, changing ideas of how success is defined for non-profit (or 
social purpose) organisations rather than wholly reconstructing its application (Grossman et al., 
2013). It is definitely not redefining the philanthropic sector in terms of amounts disbursed. In 
2001, for example, the application of venture philanthropy was estimated to account for just 0.2% 
of total foundation giving in the US (Moody, 2009). It is also recognised that due to differences 
in the concept’s definition and application, drawing tight boundaries around what is and is 
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not conceived to be venture philanthropy, what its value is, and who is and is not applying the 
concept is problematic. Questions raised in the debate include: how scale and growth of grantee 
organisations can be best supported; what time and size commitment is required for grants to 
achieve meaningful success; how performance should be measured; how grantees should be 
selected; and what other non-financial support may be required. 
The EVPA’s definition of venture 
philanthropy is philanthropy that: “works to 
build stronger social purpose organisations 
by providing them with both financial and 
non-financial support in order to increase 
their societal impact.” They also suggest 
that a set of widely accepted characteristics 
are common to this approach. These 
are: high engagement, tailored financing, 
multi-year support, non-financial support, 
involvement of networks, organisational 
capacity-building, and performance 
measurement. How this translates into practices, they propose, will vary according to local 
conditions (EVPA website 2013). 
Social purpose organisations
The use of the term social purpose organisation is an important element of this definition of 
venture philanthropy. The EVPA uses it to emphasise that unlike the Morino Institute definition, 
and the Emerson illustration, venture philanthropy may fund a range of organisational types, from 
charities and non-profit organisations to socially driven businesses. So whilst Emerson’s model 
(Figure 4) places venture philanthropists in a quadrant only able to fund charities, the implication 
is that they could move further right to fund and catalyse commercial enterprises too. A number 
of the foundations interviewed (Lundin Foundation and Shell Foundation for example), will invest 
in or partner with for-profit social enterprises as well as not-for-profits, not least for their ability 
to attract a wider array of financial funding types (e.g. equity investments) and generate profit for 
themselves as they mature or at a minimum become self-sustaining over time. 
Beneath the blanket term of venture philanthropy, the foundations interviewed use different 
terms to be more specific about their particular approaches and to differentiate themselves from 
the more generalised venture philanthropy field. Terms such as enterprise philanthropy, impact 
investing, applying business principles and angel philanthropy were all referenced in this context.
At face value, the explicit application of a venture capital or a business approach to philanthropy 
raises questions for concern as posed by a Council of Foundations paper in 2001. For example: 
•	 What is an appropriate level of involvement between a philanthropist and their grantee 
organisation? What is healthy and what is intrusive and what are the implications for 
governance? 
•	 Does the approach constitute a collision of value systems between the for-profit and not-for 
profit worlds and how is this resolved? 
•	 How does the (occasional) introduction of a for-profit motive distort decision making and 
prioritisation (otherwise known as mission drift)? 
The idea of venture philanthropy found 
popular expression in 1997 with the 
publication of a Harvard Business 
Review article, which recommended that 
philanthropists should consider utilising 
venture capitalist tools such as risk 
management, performance management, 
relationship management and exit 
strategies in order to have a greater impact 
in addressing societal problems.
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The interviewees were keen to highlight that at the motivational level, the approach was 
unlike venture capital specifically because their dedication to programmes and social purpose 
organisations aimed for a much higher success rate (e.g. 80% or higher) compared to a venture 
capital organisation (typically 20% to 30%). This suggests that whilst there is broad recognition 
of the “high risk” potential of foundation capital, the urge to see development projects succeed 
can drive investment behaviours (of financial and non-financial assistance) that substantially 
mitigate riskier ventures. “What we do directs targeted resources to produce specific, measurable 
achievements so it’s like venture capital in that way, but we certainly do not invest in ten initiatives 
and then only expect three to pay off.” Heather Grady, VP, the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Defining venture philanthropy for this report
For the foundations in this report, some subtle differentiators to the EVPA definition of venture 
philanthropy are apparent. These primarily relate to the use of research to determine points 
of maximum leverage (where resource deployment can maximise impact), to the methods of 
evaluation of that impact and to longer-term “patient” relationships with SPOs that reflect the 
efforts required to generate new markets and enabling environments for enterprise solutions. 
As such, a working definition for venture philanthropy focused on development that 
encapsulates these subtle distinguishing features provides some boundaries, for determining 
what may or may not be considered a venture philanthropy approach in the development field. 
For the purposes of this report then: 
“Venture philanthropy for development is an entrepreneurial approach to philanthropy that 
combines a variety of financial and non-financial resources to identify, analyse, co-ordinate and 
support self-sustaining, systemic and scalable (for and not-for profit) solutions to development 
challenges aimed at achieving the greatest impact.” 
The definition differentiates the application of VP in the development context, reflecting the 
greater need for cross-sector enabling interventions in terms of policy, education, infrastructure 
and culture. Without devoting at least as much time and effort to the enabling environment through 
policy influence, market stimulation 
and encouraging distribution networks, 
the social purpose organisations the 
foundations support may not succeed. 
Whilst it is not exclusively the domain 
of VP in the development context, VP in 
developed economies can be undertaken 
more readily without the need for such a 
deep degree of systems innovation and 
intervention. 
The interviewees label some of these interactions as “de-risking” or mitigating a broader set of 
risks in order for their solution to succeed. Such work is highly resource-intensive and for other 
development actors and impact investors may be cost prohibitive, beyond their capability or both. 
Regardless of the degree of investment in the enabling environment, this model implies calling on 
other philanthropists to adopt similar VP-oriented approaches and to provide more catalytic capital 
to the identified partners. These additional or mainstream sources of capital can be unlocked and 
thus contribute to addressing development challenges in a more sustainable way.
The next section goes on to introduce and compare some of the actions (defined as strategic 
dimensions) associated with the new approaches that the four case study foundations are taking. 
Venture philanthropy for development is an 
entrepreneurial approach to philanthropy 
that combines a variety of financial and 
non-financial resources to identify, analyse, 
co-ordinate and support self-sustaining, 
systemic and scalable (for and not-for profit) 
solutions to development challenges aimed 
at achieving the greatest impact.
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III. A NEW STRATEGIC DIRECTION fOR fOUNDATIONS?
A desire for fundamental change
For the case study foundations, the organisational change required to adopt a venture 
philanthropy model has been “transformational”, meaning it has involved not only the redesign 
of internal processes and procedures but a wider reimagining of the foundation’s role and its 
relationship to markets, sectors and other 
actors. It reflects a shift in “worldview” where 
the core purpose for which foundations are 
seen to exist becomes more ambitious and 
results focused. Deep internal reflection processes have been necessary to question and reframe 
informing assumptions about how to create lasting solutions to development challenges. 
“We realised that what we were doing wasn’t working across everything we did. It wasn’t just 
around a particular challenge or a particular geography but it was not working for everything we 
did. It was our way of working that was wrong”.
Chris West, Director, Shell Foundation 
What has followed has been a transformation of the assumptions informing foundations’ 
overarching theories of change, which in turn has led in some cases to dramatic internal 
restructuring, refocusing of resources and rewriting of core strategies as the examples below 
testify.
Whilst it is not always possible to mark the turning point in strategy precisely, it is notable 
that the arrival of new leadership can act as a catalyst for such questioning of purpose and for 
substantial change to take place. This was the case for a number of the contributing foundations. 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s shift toward more focused and impact driven philanthropy is well 
publicised as starting with Judith Rodin’s appointment in 2005. Lundin Foundation reviewed 
its strategy with the arrival of Stephen Nairne (Managing Director) as did Emirates Foundation 
with the arrival of Clare Woodcraft (CEO). Novartis Foundation and the Edmond de Rothschild 
Foundations also pointed to new senior appointments as an impetus for change. 
“The new president has broad authority to change the way the Foundation works. Judith 
brought in new staff from all different sectors: NGO, private and government, producing a creative 
dynamic in the Foundation. The changes opened the opportunity to fundamentally question how 
philanthropy creates impact within a broader system of actors.”
Heather Grady, VP, the Rockefeller Foundation
Conversely, conscious of the potential for change to be too dependent on specific leaders, 
Shell Foundation’s 2010 report “Enterprise Solutions to Scale” was published in part to share their 
journey of transformation with others, but also to cement change internally (Shell Foundation, 
2010).
Strategic dimensions of the change
Strategy can be broadly divided into three areas: why an organisation exists, i.e. its raison 
d’être or purpose; what it does to fulfil its purpose; and how it chooses to deploy its resources to 
achieve those ends. Much analysis, learning and insight is necessary to make informed choices 
in these three areas and for the foundations interviewed, this has involved the employment of 
The means have changed but the ends 
have not.
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external consultants (Emirates Foundation), a prolonged period of reflection and review (Shell 
Foundation), experiments with new ways of doing things (Lundin Foundation) and root and 
branch restructuring of people and resources (The Rockefeller Foundation). Yet whilst much 
of this work has focused on what the foundations should do and how they should do it, their 
fundamental purpose remains broadly unchanged. The means have changed but the ends have 
not. The Rockefeller Foundation’s mission is the same as it was in 1913. 
The following box summarises key dimensions of the transition that the foundations are 
undertaking as part of their new ways of working. The movement “from” and “to” in most cases 
is a general direction of travel rather than a dominant feature. As foundation representatives 
highlighted at a review workshop gathering participating foundations, these features point more 
towards a broadening of scope while integrating previous dimensions rather than radically 
replacing one approach with another (see Table 1). 
Dimension From Towards 
1 Strategic framing Widespread giving (traditional resource transfer) Targeted investing (resources targeted in 
new ways)
2 Scale of intervention Project based Systems or sector based and focused
3 Sector focus Third (charity or not-for-profit) sector Sector agnostic
4 Funding mechanisms Grants Blended finance (grants, soft loans, equity 
investment etc.) 
5 Engagement style Minimal (light touch) Foundation supplying partner with 
technical and management assistance and 
capacity building 
6 Engagement period Short (e.g. 1-2 years) Long (5-10 years or more)
7 Culture and capability of 
staff
Altruistic, administrative, financial Innovative, multi-disciplinary, commercial
8 Success criteria Inputs and outputs Outcomes and impact
Table 1. Strategic dimensions
Whilst the foundations recognise these dimensions as evident in their transition there is notable 
heterogeneity. The differences between the case study foundations are summarised in Table 2. 
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Dimension Emirates Foundation Lundin Foundation The Rockefeller Foundation Shell Foundation
1 Strategic 
framing
In-house creation of 
scalable, self-sufficient 
programmes for UAE 
youth development
Development and 
scale-up of market 
orientated solutions to 
development issues
Convening regional actors to 
develop systemic solutions; 
grant funding of scalable 
initiatives
Development and scale-
up of market orientated 
solutions to address 
development issues
2 Scale of 
intervention




Global: regional, national, 
sub-national (e.g. cities)
Targets early-stage social 
enterprises and market 
enablers with vision for 
global scale-up
3 Sector focus Youth in the UAE SMEs in Africa Energy, 
financial inclusion and 
smallholder agriculture
Ecosystems, health, secure 
livelihoods, cities (resilience 
and infrastructure)
SMEs, urban mobility, 
agricultural supply 




grants drawn from 
a combination of 





Grant funding for initiatives. 
Programme related 









in-house as individual 





(NED), and informal 
roles, management and 
strategic support and 
capacity building
Facilitator-style relationships 
with diverse actors; 
convenor and developer of 
networks















oriented. Staff have 
social enterprise and 
business skills; sector 
and subject matter 
expertise is key 
Venture capital style; 





Scientific and evidence 
led; staff is increasingly 
business-like and impact 
driven. Additional research 
and evaluation capability; 




values with commercial 
orientation. Additional 




Programme level output 
KPIs set to measure 
success with ambition 
for wider impact 
assessment 
SPO level KPIs linked 
to wider outcomes and 
third party field studies
Programme KPIs and 
independent evaluation and 
monitoring at milestones 
linked to defined outcomes 
SPO level KPIs linked to 
wider outcomes and third 
party field studies
Table 2. Strategic dimensions – Comparative table
 
Strategic dimensions explained
Strategic framing – From widespread giving to targeted investing
Having undergone much of this transformation, some of the interviewees were critical of their 
old approach to philanthropy (the “from” dimension above). They saw their previous attempts as 
complicit in sustaining problems of dependency and low absorptive capacity in the regions in 
which they operate. Tales of creeping dissatisfaction with approaches, results and the scale of 
impact achieved mirrored stories heard from other philanthropists that have entered the sector 
from the tech and dot.com sectors (Bishop and Green, 2008; Osberg, 2010). 
This pronounced turn (which some have compared to a Copernican Revolution) is visible in 
the broadening of funded solutions to include investments in commercial enterprise. Framing the 
foundations as investors rather than philanthropists is important semantically because investors 
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make investments with the expectation that they appreciate in the future and will produce returns. 
Yet, the philanthropy dimension remains ever-present, given the nature of the capital invested and 
the possibility that the project will not succeed as expected.
Scale of intervention – From project-based to systems- or sector-based and focused 
In the pursuit of impact and scale, the case study foundations display a preference for taking a 
systems-thinking approach. This is visible in their initial research phase to identify points of leverage. 
It is also visible in their efforts to intervene at multiple points and levels simultaneously. Rather than 
funding individual organisations exclusively, they can convene numerous organisations and partners 
(including ODA providers) around a common issue, funding research to produce an evidence base, 
facilitating stakeholder dialogue and influencing for policy change and market stimulation. 
Working systemically means engaging 
with a diversity of organisations and 
institutions at different levels: individual, 
organisational and focused on the enabling 
environment. “We crowd-in grantees, allies 
and partners. Through conferences and 
global gatherings, we share our ideas and 
strategies and seek potential partners whose 
networks and resources will complement our own”. Heather Grady, VP, the Rockefeller Foundation
The Emirates Foundation engaged stakeholders from across government, education, financial 
and private sectors and non-profits to determine where to focus their programmes. “We spent a 
year looking at issues… we found lots of small scale ad hoc initiatives at the level of one individual 
or institution but nothing UAE wide and nothing scalable… we formed a stakeholder working 
group … meanwhile checking externally on what others were doing, who’s doing it successfully 
in other countries, looking for partners and experts”. Clare Woodcraft, CEO, Emirates Foundation 
For the Rockefeller Foundation, this methodology has become common practice. Their “Asian 
Cities Climate Change Resilience Network” initiative convenes actors from across government, 
urban development, aid and business to co-operate on the production and roll out of city-level 
climate change resilience strategies. Substantial early investment in cross-sector research has 
provided evidence on the problems at stake, such as energy, transport and sanitation, and enabled 
the design of potential responses, resulting in the collaborative production of urban climate change 
resilience strategies. The Rockefeller Foundation has formalised this systems perspective and 
matched it with relevant staff capability. 
“When looking for a managing director 
I am almost looking for an architect. I 
am looking for someone that can build a 
time-bound initiative that’s going to shift 
a system within a set number of years. 
This involves creating the framework for 
the initiative’s goals, outcomes, theory 
of change, results based framework and 
monitoring and evaluation, then looking at 
the field and deciding which organisations will be the most complementary partners.”
Heather Grady, VP, the Rockefeller Foundation
Framing the foundations as investors 
rather than philanthropists is important 
semantically because investors make 
investments with the expectation that they 
appreciate in the future and will produce 
returns.
Rather than funding individual organisations 
exclusively, they can convene numerous 
organisations and partners (including 
ODA providers) around a common issue, 
funding research to produce an evidence 
base, facilitating stakeholder dialogue and 
influencing for policy change and market 
stimulation.
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Such thinking is also evident in the market-based interventions of the Lundin Foundation. 
Comaco, in Zambia, a co-operative that promotes sustainable agriculture, increases food security 
for small-holder farmers through improved farming methods and market building, radically 
reducing the incidence of poaching and returning local ecosystems to health. In that case, the 
evidence base was collated and peer reviewed to determine the social and environmental impacts 
of the interventions and where to target future funds. The CEO of Comaco, Dale Lewis, is adopting 
the role of what Heather Grady calls an “architect”, now building alliances with government 
policymakers and multilateral institutions to scale the model on which Comaco is based. 
By way of comparison, the Edmond de Rothschild Foundations stressed the importance of 
collaborative approaches to identify issues and solutions, offering the example of working in the 
field of reconstructive surgery, an underserved need for victims of brutality in failed states. 
“We were working with a group of plastic surgeons from Switzerland, who were engaged in 
humanitarian work in challenging environments like the Congo. The concept of flying doctors – 
that’s been done. They fly in and they fly out, but the need remains the same. In terms of strategic 
thinking how can we go beyond that? So we started to train other [local] doctors in this specialist 
area … and help them to structure an organisation and recruit, to become managers…” 
Firoz Ladak, Executive Director, the Edmond de Rothschild Foundations
Sector focus – From charity/not-for-profit to inclusive of for-profit and private sectors 
With a focus on finding optimal solutions to systemic issues, there is no reason to think that 
the philanthropist should necessarily favour a for-profit or not-for-profit approach from the outset. 
Some preferences may emerge depending on the issues to be addressed, and Shell Foundation 
and Lundin Foundation work explicitly with the private sector in delivering market-based solutions 
and in supporting social enterprises. These organisational forms have an advantage over not-
for-profits in that they can take on investment in exchange for equity and have the potential to 
become self-financing businesses over time. Whilst the Emirates Foundation also recognises 
the benefit in the approach, organisational forms such as social enterprises are still nascent in 
the United Arab Emirates which necessarily leads to developing partnerships with not-for profit 
actors. Regardless, the ability to incorporate such market-based approaches is broadening the 
array of options foundations have at their disposal. The Edmond de Rothschild Foundations and 
the Rockefeller Foundation are clear that these are “additional tools in the bag”, not replacing 
grant-making but allowing for more creative solutions to be developed. 
Utilising these more market-based approaches to addressing development challenges has 
led some foundations to focus more overtly on regions and sectors where potential exists for 
markets to evolve. The Rockefeller Foundation looks for regions with a higher “market dynamism”, 
where new technologies and innovations are more readily taken up in civil society and where 
market economies are strengthening. This meant an initial preference for Asia over Africa when 
developing their programme focused on city-level urban climate change resilience (Asian Cities 
Climate Change Resilience Network). Shell Foundation likewise noted that culturally their cook-
stoves initiative has seen greater success in countries where faster development is taking place. 
This poses the problem of the limitation of these approaches to solving problems in the poorest 
countries where markets are less mature and where the enabling environment can be seen as 
less conducive to market-based approaches.
Similar to impact investing, there is a risk that a focus on private sector approaches could 
bias philanthropists towards more readily monetised solutions and sectors. Sectors such as 
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low carbon transport and infrastructure, agriculture and agricultural supply chains, energy, 
technology and finance predominate although education remains a significant focus of funding 
for a number of the foundations (e.g. The Rockefeller Foundation, Emirates Foundation, the 
Edmond de Rothschild Foundations). 
Funding mechanisms – From grants alone to a mix of financial instruments 
The EVPA member survey (2013) indicates a possible trend in that between 2010 and 2011, 
VPs moved away from grants in favour of other financial instruments such as debt, equity and 
guarantees. For foundations however, such financial innovations are still nascent in use. Burckart 
(2013) found that since 1968, when Ford Foundation made its first programme-related investment, 
only 1% of US foundations’ assets have been used for anything other than grant-giving and only 
5% of that amount has been used for any kind of equity style investment.
Despite intentions to do otherwise, of the four foundations interviewed, all still use grants 
as a primary funding mechanism. The Rockefeller Foundation also uses comparatively small 
programme-related investments (in the form of debt, equity and guarantees) with a policy not to 
invest in the same initiatives and organisations to which it provides grants. Lundin Foundation finds 
it is now giving more grants than before its transformation in support of its impact investments. 
“We use our flexibility to create what 
I call fit for purpose capital structures 
and that includes grants. In fact we are 
providing more grants now than we were 
before. Market-based solutions are not 
appropriate everywhere. Particularly in 
[fragile economies] there is a critical need for grants, especially at early stages.”
Stephen Nairne, Managing Director, Lundin Foundation
Terms used to help frame this approach to philanthropic finance included angel, patient capital, 
smart subsidy as well as impact investing. 
“Angel” had been used in the past by 
Shell Foundation to highlight the very early 
stage nature of the interventions made, 
referring to angel investment, investments 
commonly made by high net-worth 
individuals who invest in early stage start-ups for reasons of interest as well as return. “Patient 
capital” was used to highlight numerous factors such as a longer investment timeframe, higher 
risk appetite, availability to for-profits and not-for-profits, and below market returns with above 
market social and environmental outcomes. “Smart subsidy” was used to distinguish the way 
grants are deployed to enable scale, efficiency and competitiveness rather than constrain these 
aspects (in the way poorly targeted subsidies and grants are perceived to do) and to emphasise 
the strategic nature of the approach. Smart subsidies are transparent, time restricted, rule-bound 
and used where possible to attract other forms of capital (Morduch 2005).
Differences in terminology mask an aligned view that well-targeted grants are necessary for 
novel solutions to development challenges to succeed. In developing economies, particularly 
in post conflict contexts, interviewees considered venture philanthropy to be able to make the 
much needed early stage, high risk and catalytic grant funding that is out of reach of the impact 
investment and banking community and even traditional aid. As an example, one third of the 
Similar to impact investing, there is a risk 
that a focus on private sector approaches 
could bias philanthropists towards more 
readily monetised solutions and sectors.
Despite intentions to do otherwise, of the 
four foundations interviewed, all still use 
grants as a primary funding mechanism.
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USD 250 m deployed by the Omidyar Network (an “impact first” impact investor) since 2004 to 
support base of the pyramid (BoP) start-ups has been in the form of grants (Bannick and Golman 
2012).
Another reason grants are still important is the embryonic and systemic nature of the work 
these foundations do compared with other philanthropists. These foundations often start at the 
level of concept rather than funding an existing initiative and therefore either establish or cofound 
the solution with partners. In some instances, they are also seeking to become market-makers in 
developing countries where doing business is significantly more challenging and accompanies a 
higher risk of failure. 
“We imagined the social investment landscape as a relay. We’d start something off, then 
someone else would come in with second stage support and then they would hand it on as 
more commercial sources of investment became available. The reality was quite different. What 
happens is that you start running the race with the simple aim to prove new models can work, but 
then you look around and find few organisations are willing to pick up the baton to grow these 
further. So the type and longevity of support we provide has had to evolve way beyond our original 
thinking.” 
Chris West, Director, Shell Foundation 
One of the “actors” referred to is the impact investment community and it is thought that 
impact investors systematically under-invest in creating the conditions necessary for innovations 
and new sectors to be catalysed and scaled (Bannick and Goldman, 2012).
Frustration was shared around the lack of other foundations and investors willingness to align 
with such an early stage approach. Why this is the case requires further research and analysis, 
although the organisational challenges associated with adopting the approach (see Section V: 
Lessons and Recommendations below) and the personal reputational risk that foundation leaders 
and impact investors believe they need to take on may be factors. 
Engagement style – From light touch to valued partner
The core differentiator or “litmus test” for VP according to John (2006) is the high degree of 
engagement, not the financial instrument deployed. This study finds that what this looks like in 
practice ranges across a wide spectrum from quarterly attendance at board meetings through 
to a co-founded venture such as Envirofit’s cook stoves business that “is like a marriage” where 
foundation members work so closely with 
SPO management that they “feel like one 
of the team”.
Despite only one of these foundations 
being co-located with their SPOs, levels 
of contact in addition to face-to-face 
meetings were very high. For Emirates Foundation, this high engagement has been institutionalised 
such that programmes are incubated in house (for example young leaders’ and social inclusion 
programmes) and benefit from a shared service approach (IT, HR, finance, monitoring and 
evaluation etc.). 
The type of assistance provided is dependent on the initiative, resource capability and resource 
availability of the foundations. As initiatives mature, needs also change and the foundations have 
to be able to flex both the quantity and quality of support on offer. Such flexibility requires the 
availability of highly skilled and talented human resources. 
The core differentiator or “litmus test”  
for VP is the high degree of engagement, 
not the financial instrument deployed.
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Pradeep Pursnani from Shell Foundation discussed how he sees his work with Envirofit, one 
of the SPOs. 
“Slowly we will get less involved operationally and move towards strategic and governance 
issues and will probably maintain a role on the board. We’ll continue to work in the sector and 
try to use our learning to catalyse the wider market. We’re currently working across the supply 
chain, for example on new models for distribution. Perhaps in the future we’ll support the next 
generation of stoves.”
Pradeep Pursnani, Business Director, Shell Foundation
The high quality of the engagement is due in part to the amount of time the foundations invest 
in partner and initiative selection upfront, a strong element of which is about ensuring a shared 
ethos and ability to work well together. For Comaco and Lundin Foundation, and Envirofit and Shell 
Foundation there was an acknowledgement of each party’s ability to add value to the relationship, 
to be committed to long-term success (together with an acceptance of the inevitability of short-
term setbacks) and open, transparent and frank communications between parties. 
Engagement period – From short (1-2 years) to long (5-10 years or more)
“Our bigger challenge will be how to transform our programmes into social enterprises that can 
self-generate and self-sustain. We see this as a five to ten year time horizon that needs capacity 
building, market development, regulatory reform, social enterprise registration and improved cost 
efficiencies including the need to move away from centralised support functions as they spin-off.”
Clare Woodcraft, CEO, Emirates Foundation
In the development context, the number of years of support received by an initiative or a single 
SPO is often in excess of five years, with a longer time horizon considered to be desirable in 
order to establish related sector and system changes from scratch. The Rockefeller Foundation’s 
initiatives aim to exit and hand over their initiatives after nine years of engagement. 
unclear exit strategies
With only the Rockefeller Foundation having a clear policy around the length of engagement, 
the question arises as to how the principal-agent relationship manifests in these relationships and 
how the investment and other interests of 
different parties are managed. In venture 
capital structures, conditions are typically 
agreed at the outset that would trigger 
engagement termination, whether related 
to the realisation of the investment or the 
right to abandon. VCs are also legally 
required to liquidate their funds after a 
certain time period (Sahlman, 1990). Such 
policies and regulations have not yet been consistently adopted in the relationships between 
foundations and their SPOs and so exit strategies remain more an intention than a clear plan of 
action in the case study examples. 
As Grossman et al. (2013) recognise, exit strategies for venture philanthropy are still evolving 
and harder to ascertain than venture capital (initial public offering, sell the business etc.). For 
many of those interviewed working more systemically, the certainty of exit was reduced because 
Exit strategies for venture philanthropy 
are still evolving and harder to ascertain 
than venture capital. The certainty of exit 
is reduced because development issues 
are often multi-faceted and fluid and the 
solutions novel. 
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development issues are often multi-faceted and fluid (sometimes called “wicked problems” – 
those with incomplete, contradictory, and changing needs that are difficult to analyse) and the 
solutions novel. High levels of organisational interdependence and relational ties further reduced 
the desire to exit. 
In this context, the term “exit” is perhaps best conceived as a process of transition whereby 
a VP that seeks to develop scalable and replicable solutions switches its resources to different 
points of leverage be that a new geography, new product and service development or research 
and advocacy in order to achieve these aims rather than terminate the engagement completely. 
“We’re talking about problems that impact billions of people. Envirofit have sold 700 000 stoves 
and will soon get to the point where they’re selling one to two million a year – but that’s only 
scratching the surface so the first point is that we set big goals for scale. Our long-term aim is 
then to grow the new sector. That may mean broadening existing partnerships to create new 
solutions to common barriers, and working with new partners to build the infrastructure needed 
for the market as a whole to thrive.”
Pradeep Pursnani, Business Director, Shell Foundation
Culture and capability – From altruistic and administrative to innovative, multidisciplinary 
and commercial
Commensurate with the ideological turn to applying venturing style principles is a move towards 
a more diverse and innovative culture. Active recruitment from the private sector has brought 
new operating practices into foundations, along with specialist competence in finance, marketing 
and business administration. The stronger orientation towards results and impact can also be 
associated with a more commercial mindset. However the patience required for funding SPOs 
for up to ten years or more runs counter 
to the dominance of shorter-term, even 
quarterly, returns. For innovation to take 
off, concerted attention is also needed to 
transition the foundations’ cultures from 
one where “failure” is frowned upon to one 
of learning and experimentation.   
In addition to the provision of business management and technical assistance, some of the 
foundations have chosen to develop in-house capacity in research and development and in 
impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation. The Rockefeller Foundation, known historically 
for its scientific approach, has built a department dedicated to “searching and scanning” for 
identifying new trends, emergent issues and interpreting these. In parallel it has expanded its 
monitoring and evaluation function to examine the impact of its interventions. The Emirates 
Foundation is similarly investing, having restructured to create a team dedicated to research and 
advocacy which can both examine emerging trends and develop appropriate policy positions, 
and a monitoring and evaluation team to determine impact. 
As these foundations have focused on specific issues in partnership with SPOs, they 
have developed a deeper understanding and capability around what is needed managerially, 
technically and at the issue level. In essence, the foundation teams are creating boutique socially-
driven management consultancies with very high management competency. Doug Miller of the 
EVPA cited in Grossman et al. (2013) emphasises the importance of this, “venture philanthropy, 
not unlike venture capital or private equity is a methodology which is only as good as those who 
practice it.”
For innovation to take off, concerted 
attention is also needed to transition the 
foundations’ cultures from one where 
‘failure’ is frowned upon to one of learning 
and experimentation.  
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The case study organisations have developed the required capabilities in different ways. 
The Rockefeller Foundation has used its global brand to attract world class executives highly 
regarded in each of their fields (market research, monitoring and evaluation etc.) Shell Foundation 
has drawn from the private sector externally but also by using its links with the corporate parent 
has attracted likeminded talent from Royal Dutch Shell. The Emirates Foundation is committed 
to growing its talent in-house as part of its wider social commitment to youth in UAE and is 
undertaking an extensive period of up-skilling and culture change with its existing staff.
Noting that Shell Foundation has needed to double its headcount in order to realise its new 
model, Chris West acknowledged how important the foundation’s staff now are. “If we had to cut 
something I would cut income before cutting staff”.
 Cultural change typically lags behind strategic and operational change and certain practices 
take time to catch up. The mid-term evaluation for Rockefeller’s Asian Cities Climate Change 
Resilience Network (ACCCRN) initiative notes discrepancies between the intent towards long-
term partnerships and a more short-term transactional approach to grant giving and SPO 
engagement following a traditional application procedure. Inconsistencies are to be expected 
when foundations make rapid adjustments to long-established routines. The Emirates Foundation 
is actively using staff development to mitigate such dilemmas.
Success criteria – From inputs and outputs to outcomes and impact
The foundations interviewed regret that 
official donors view their contribution to 
development merely in terms of the volume 
of financial resources they provide. Even 
the Rockefeller Foundation, once a major 
financial force in addressing social issues, 
is dwarfed by both the scale of the problems faced and the new sources of philanthropic finance 
available today. Whilst this has led the foundations to thinking about resource allocation and 
the outcomes they seek to achieve in new ways, there is still a clear opportunity for greater 
co-operation between them that achieves economies of scale and shares learning and scarce 
resources more effectively. 
Measuring foundation grant size is only useful if calculated relative to the impact achieved. 
Clearly, the more that is known about the social impact an investment achieves, the more accurate 
the performance ratio of investment dollar per unit of desired outcome. Such data and the more 
sophisticated data-gathering efforts it requires, improves resource allocation and efficiency at 
programme and organisational level. It also overturns some long-established assumptions about 
the need for low core operational or overhead costs. In other words, success for the foundation 
is no longer determined by size of grant (inputs) or even immediate results (outputs, e.g. number 
of volunteers trained). Rather outcomes (such as the benefit to “service users” of volunteers’ 
assistance) and the social impact of the programme (e.g. generating greater awareness and pro-
social values in young people) become the indicators of success. Quality staff, low turnover and 
solid monitoring of one’s KPIs are seen as key to achieving good results. What is seen as the 
old style of performance measurement (e.g. looking at the overhead ratio as one measure of 
cost efficiency or focusing too much on inputs such as the number of staff trained) was cited for 
creating continued dependency on grant funding rather than creating sustainable organisations 
and solutions with the high quality core capability to continue indefinitely. 
The foundations interviewed regret that 
official donors view their contribution to 
development merely in terms of the volume 
of financial resources they provide.
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At the review workshop, the foundations in this report agreed that the favoured tax status 
conferred on them comes with an implicit responsibility to spend their money efficiently and 
effectively. Some participants even suggested that if foundations were unable to prove they 
were able to add more value to the tackling of social challenges than the public sector in their 
home countries (through the provision of ODA) then such preferential tax treatment should be 
scrutinised. 
The search for maximising the ratio between financial and non-financial inputs and outcomes 
and impact has led to a new lexicon being used to describe criteria for success. “Leverage” – the 
ability to attract additional public and private funding and non-financial support, either in addition 
to the foundation’s own or to take an initiative to the next stage of maturity – is commonly used 
in this context.  
“Scale” was also a common marker of success; generally meaning reaching larger scale, but 
this was not formulated as such by all. The Shell Foundation arrived at their definition of scale in 
2007. This definition includes: large-scale development outcomes (measurable); multiple country 
and/or regional operations (measurable); earned income derived from the market (measurable); 
leverage that matches or exceeds their grant contribution (measurable); and management team 
competence to execute the venture (subjective).
The word “impact” was frequently used in the interviews as a summary indicator of success. 
Core to the VP model in development is the realisation of “impact”, but although used liberally, it 
is a not a well-defined term. 
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IV. DETERMINING IMPACT
The foundations in this study represent broad diversity in size, age, reach and focus. As a 
result, what constitutes “impact” and how each foundation determines its success in achieving 
it varies widely too. 
The Lundin Foundation is a relatively small and young private foundation in this study group, with 
a staff of seven and an impact investment portfolio in 2012 of USD 13.13 m focused predominantly 
on sub-Saharan Africa. It generated USD 38 m in revenue on its investments in 2012, did business 
with over 54 000 rural farmers and micro-enterprises and enabled over 449 000 rural clients to 
access agricultural, financial and clean energy services. 
The Rockefeller Foundation, conversely, 
is the longest established (which celebrated 
its centenary in 2013) foundation in this 
group, with arguably the broadest reach 
globally. Its charitable giving and activities 
totalled USD 142 m in 2011 and it has a staff of 170. It does not aggregate impact figures to the 
foundation level, but collects data at the initiative level. 
There was broad consensus amongst the case study foundations that taking a more strategic 
approach to philanthropy, seeking opportunities to leverage non-financial as well as financial 
resources, and utilising more “high engagement” practices (Kramer, 2009) all lead to greater 
impact than the methods they had hitherto employed. 
Measuring impact and particularly the relative impact of the venture philanthropy model against 
other models, however, is challenging. Because the foundations generally take a system-wide 
rather than project-based approach, and because they work with and through numerous other 
actors, it is often not possible to attribute outcomes, let alone impact to specific activities. This 
challenge is similar to what traditional donors face when they can take direct credit for results 
(attribution) versus when they are part of a broader system of programmes (contribution). Unlike 
with physical sciences and healthcare, there is not the counterfactual or control group evidence 
against which to benchmark their results. Ironically, the very efforts the case study foundations 
are making to maximise impact impedes defendable evidence-based impact assessment. 
Random control trials (RCTs) whilst providing the most robust data, are not practical to ventures 
of this nature, and evaluation specialists contributing to this report challenged the diversion of 
scarce resource into RCTs in this field for that reason.
Proxy* measures of outcomes, where more simple and visible indicators are used to represent 
more subtle and intangible outcomes, are being used by the foundations in some instances. 
Examples include the number of city-level climate change resilience (CCR) strategies produced, 
or growth in the number of cookstoves distributed. Such proxies carry weight in these scenarios 
because the upfront investment in rigorous research has identified such solutions as points of 
significant leverage in the “system” (i.e. in promoting city-wide social engagement with urban 
climate change resilience or in improving indoor air quality and health, and reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions and fuel expenditure). 
Given that the foundations work in this systemic manner an alternative benchmark of impact 
is necessary, such as longitudinal data. However, when asked to compare relative impact before 
and after adopting VP principles, the difficulties in making such comparisons are revealed. One 
CEO (Lundin Foundation) described it as “trying to compare apples and oranges” with entirely 
different data before and after. 
Core to the VP model in development is the 
realisation of “impact”, but although used 
liberally, it is a not a well-defined term. 
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“All I can tell you is that I feel confident now that we are significantly more impactful… I don’t 
think I could ever show you data that could categorically prove this…” 
Stephen Nairne, Managing Director, Lundin Foundation
The relatively early adoption of the VP 
model in some instances is also an issue 
in finding relevant data. For the Emirates 
Foundation, only “input” data at hand, 
e.g. the size of grants made and the 
overall endowment fund, is available pre-
transition in 2011. Post-transition, the foundation is now tracking programme level indicators such 
as volunteers trained and attendance on programmes, data they are aggregating to become part 
of foundation-level figures. For example, in 2012 over 10 000 UAE youth took part in programmes 
and activities. Whilst these are still output and outcome level indicators currently, they provide 
a snapshot of year-on-year progress on youth involvement and development and enable ratios 
such as “investment-per-volunteer” to be tracked. More sophisticated measures of social impact 
are now in planning. 
Diverse approaches to assessing impact
The foundations in this study use a variety of methods for assessing results. The breadth of 
performance indicators tracked, data collected and the locus of responsibility for monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) reflect the diversity of objectives being pursued. Some foundations have 
chosen to invest more heavily in M&E, recognising it as a change intervention in its own right. 
The Rockefeller Foundation has for instance adopted a more learning-centric approach, locating 
monitoring activities as close to the action as possible to promote partner engagement and real-
time learning. The outcomes discussed in the mid-term evaluation report for the Asian Cities 
Climate Change Resilience Network are primarily qualitative, concerned with, for example, levels 
of engagement from city officials and businesses, capacity building and knowledge transfer, and 
the locus of ownership of climate resilience strategies. Taking a more qualitative than quantitative 
approach to assessing results means snapshot comparisons cannot be made, but learning can 
be shared. Other quantitative indicators such as volumes of additional funding attracted from 
third-party donors (over USD 200 m to 2013) provide additional insight into the perceived value 
of the initiative. 
Stakeholder inclusive methods such as Participatory Action Research (PAR) are helping to 
address concerns from developing country evaluation professionals that M&E is too often a “rich 
donor” preoccupation with short-term social and financial return on investment. Effective impact 
evaluation, says Zenda Ofir of the African Evaluation Association, needs to consider the long-
term sustainability of the initiative and be alert to unintended consequences. 
 The example of Comaco, the social enterprise supported by the Lundin Foundation, provides 
an alternative illustration. Comaco conducts its own impact assessment and publishes it in peer 
reviewed journals. The Lundin Foundation in turn aggregates data across its portfolio using the 
industry-standard IRIS metrics and Pulse software8 to track 20 indicators including smallholder 
supplier and micro-entrepreneur numbers. Focusing at the SPO level like this, quantitative 
measures become easier to track. Shell Foundation monitors a number of indicators such as 
jobs created and cookstoves sold. From the latter they determine carbon dioxide and particulate 
reductions based on average fuel saving data collated by Envirofit, with output numbers as a 
proxy for extrapolating outcome and impact figures. 
Endowment size, or even grant size, is far 
too blunt an instrument for determining 
relative influence and impact of different 
foundations.
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Not all the foundations aggregate data up to the foundation-wide level as the Emirates 
Foundation does. With the sectors, goals and methods of the foundations studied in this report 
being so heterogeneous, developing a standard framework for future comparison would be far 
from straightforward. Some, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, monitor programme and SPO-
level indicators instead. Given the diversity of programmes funded, this is not surprising. However 
it emphasises the point that endowment size, or even grant size, is far too blunt an instrument for 
determining relative influence and impact of different foundations. 
Ultimately, assessing the relative merit of venture philanthropy against other philanthropic 
models needs additional longitudinal data, as well as standardised (and thus comparable) 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks including social/financial return on investment (ROI) ratios. 
For example, tracking the value of commercial grade investment raised following the catalytic 
effect of the early stage interventions by a VP can give a measure to the leverage achieved. 
Success here is measured in volumes of conventional capital attracted to the sector. Shell 
Foundation already tracks this data. Consideration to unintended consequences and unexpected 
ancillary benefits, through more holistic qualitative evaluation methods, may also provide a more 
rounded picture of systems-level impacts as Rockefeller aims to identify. Over time, as common 
standards such as IRIS are increasingly agreed upon and taken up, it may become easier to make 
comparisons and substantiate (or contest) claims of impact achieved. 
For the time being, the question remains for whose benefit such depth of scrutiny in determining 
impact is necessary. For the foundations in this report, the priority is to inform their grant-making 
and investment decisions on an iterative basis. Therefore data that reflects the social ROI is key, 
alongside the ability to share it for learning purposes. High quality evidence of a qualitative and 
social nature is potentially equally or more valuable here than quantitative metrics. However, for 
impact investors and development finance to collaborate, a different set of metrics (“investment 
grade analysis”) and potentially a more open and standardised tracking system that promotes 
transparency may need to be developed. This would allow these metrics to be made available 
to beneficiaries and even to partner countries, acknowledging that they are accountable to 
taxpayers for overall development results. For the time being, this is still work in progress.
IV. DETERMINING IMPACT
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V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
fOR OThER fOUNDATIONS 
The primary sources of data for the lessons shared below are the case study foundations. 
However, the three additional foundations – the Edmond de Rothschild, the Novartis and 
JPMorgan Chase Foundation – have all contributed to deepen and augment the findings. 
As already emphasised, the foundations in this study are all at different stages on their journey. 
They have started from very different positions and have adopted VP principles in different 
ways. However, there are some commonalities in their experience of testing and applying those 
principles in practice. Some of these experiences have been gained over a short amount of 
time (for the Emirates Foundation only two years). For others, such as Shell Foundation and the 
Rockefeller Foundation, this journey has taken ten years and counting. By comparison, certain 
corporations may have gone from “good to great” and fallen by the wayside in that time. These 
lessons and recommendations then are offered as context-specific insights that may or may not 
be relevant to all. From an organisational change perspective however, the common themes of 
leadership, stimulus to change, challenges with buy-in and human resource management are 
familiar enough to provide some useful prompts to further dialogue on how to capitalise on the 
early lessons of the VP model. 
Lesson and recommendation summary
Lesson Recommendation 
Being prepared to embark on fundamental and 
comprehensive change of the foundation’s model – 
ranging from beliefs, values to strategy and operations
Undertake a complete review that includes the deep assumptions underlying 
the current philanthropic operating model and theory of change.
Be willing to question deeply held beliefs and customs 
Not waiting for change to be imposed from outside 
– there is insufficient external scrutiny or incentives 
for change in the philanthropic sector
Use internal changes, such as leaders’ transition to gain new stewardship, 
prompt reviews and increase internal accountability. 
Plan for comprehensive change but start with small experiments to 
promote learning if stewardship is slow to appear
Applying “systems thinking” and planning based on 
more upfront investment in research and evidence-
based inputs
Consider investing more in ex ante research to target investments 
and interventions more accurately, and produce an evidence base for 
evaluation later on
Including the “market-based approach” more 
systematically to achieve scale and to aim for SPO 
self-sufficiency
Add market-based approaches to interventions but be aware that not all 
challenges will warrant a market-based solution; targeted grants are still 
an essential funding tool. Intervention at policy and market level may also 
be required simultaneously
Adopting a “high engagement” approach means 
being prepared to engage more financial and human 
resources (i.e. hiring more area specialists) 
Review the foundation’s competencies and capacity when considering 
change. Specialisation, outsourcing, recruiting and training offer different 
routes to meeting future requirements
Being adaptive and staying close to field partners – 
entrepreneurial SPOs demand responsiveness and 
real-time interaction
Consciously manage the tensions between size, bureaucracy of 
supporting projects while keeping enough flexibility to allow the 
foundation to offer appropriate and dynamic support
Increasing risk tolerance, long-termism and patient 
capital
Be prepared to take more risk at an earlier stage, while aiming for longer-
term and systems-level support. “Reframe” failure as a way of learning 
and of experimenting, and as an input into the learning curve of change
“Planning the divorce with the wedding” 
(endogenising exit strategies) 
Develop and review measures of success (qualitative and quantitative) 
that will trigger exit and maintain sustainability for grantees/SPOs
Working with other development actors, especially 
governments in the field and ODA providers is 
pivotal
Take a more proactive position in the development arena and be both 
willing to collaborate and to “share the glory” and the innovation with 
others while taking into account other actors’ constraints
Learning and collaborating with peers to advance the 
impact of the foundation sector for development 
Commit to greater disclosure of lessons learned, either publicly through 
publication or privately in peer group forums. Integrate this with research 
and evaluation activity
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Lesson one – Be prepared to embark on fundamental change
It has been suggested (e.g. EVPA, 2012) that it is possible to overlay elements of venture 
philanthropy onto an existing operating model and structure. Although this may be the case, 
the foundations interviewed have all chosen to go further and have fundamentally restructured 
themselves, using VP principles to pursue more impact-driven agendas. Piecemeal application of 
principles may lead to incremental improvements in existing performance and impact, but this will 
likely be limited. More importantly, such an approach risks creating two, potentially conflicting, 
operating models and even ideologies thus creating confusion and even reputational damage.
Recommendation
To fully embrace the VP model, a willingness to consider organisation-wide change is 
preferable, possibly through a strategic review that allows the foundation to reflect on the deep 
assumptions underlying their current operating model and theory of change, as well as the 
current culture and values, noting how these are challenged by the VP model. Such a review will 
highlight strengths and potential pitfalls in attempting such fundamental paradigmatic change, 
e.g. the willingness of staff to “buy in” to 
the new model and mindset or how the 
addition of market-based approaches 
may impact relationships with existing 
beneficiaries, with Board members and 
with other stakeholders.
Lesson two – Don’t wait for change to be imposed from outside
With little external scrutiny of foundation activities, the impetus for change in the case study 
foundations has come from within, and not from stakeholders or consultants, nor necessarily 
from the foundations’ own board. In the cases shared, a growing dissatisfaction with results 
internally, whether from the leaders themselves (e.g. Shell Foundation) or by the board (e.g. 
Lundin Foundation) prompted the switch to the new model. In the Rockefeller Foundation and 
the Emirates Foundation a new leader was appointed to drive through the change agenda. The 
highly visible symbolic nature of such an action sends a strong statement inside and outside the 
foundation that significant change is intended. 
Recommendation
Changes in leadership along with the completion of major programmes, systemic shocks and 
market disruptions can all offer opportunities to review strategy and purpose and develop change 
plans. However, organisational change is not solely planned and formal and does not always 
require a major event to initiate. Whilst slower in nature, small-scale experimentation can be less 
risky and provide much needed learning and proof-points to validate the strategy. 
Lesson three – Practising systems thinking and plannig for greater upfront investment in 
evidence building
Each of the foundations interviewed has strategies grounded in systems thinking. Most have 
invested in research and evidence building to identify interventions that could achieve greatest 
impact with the most targeted action and funding. Some (the Rockefeller Foundation, the Emirates 
Foundation and the Edmond de Rothschild Foundations) then focused their activities “top-
To fully embrace the VP model, a willingness 
to consider organisation-wide change is 
preferable.
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down”, convening stakeholders from across organisations, markets, networks and governments 
to create partnerships, policy and infrastructure supportive of their planned change. Others (Shell 
Foundation, Lundin Foundation) took a more “bottom-up” approach, starting with funding and 
capacity building of specific SPOs before moving “up” to target policy and market makers. Each 
looked for where their existing strengths, reputation and knowledge could bring most benefit to 
the issues and regions they wished to serve. 
Recommendation
Invest in research, whether conducted 
in-house or with third parties, because it 
pays real dividends. On-going funding and 
capacity building can be targeted far more strategically as a result (Fiennes, 2012) including at 
multiple points around the system in question. A solid evidence base also enables more focused 
and representative performance indicators to be modelled and tracked, as well as for discoveries 
to be published and disseminated more widely to push learning forward. Whilst research can be 
resource-intensive and requires more upfront investment, shrewd co-operation with research 
institutions shares the costs and broadens the audience. 
Choosing whether to take a top-down or bottom-up approach will depend on the foundation’s 
strengths and circumstances. An existing strong reputation and association with an issue (as 
with The Rockefeller Foundation with agriculture or healthcare) make a top-down approach more 
feasible. Foundations with fewer resources available may choose to target funding and capacity 
building to SPOs to work together to achieve more than they could individually.
Lesson four – Integrating the market-based approach
Central to the model is a common belief in the power of markets to reach the poorest of the 
poor. Whilst some foundations (Shell Foundation, Lundin Foundation) prioritise an enterprising 
approach and proactively seek out such opportunities, others (e.g. The Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Edmond de Rothschild Foundations) situate market approaches in a wider landscape of 
possible solutions. 
The advantage in adopting market-based strategies is that high risk capital can be used to 
seed fund new business models and start-up operations, creating enterprises that commercial 
grade social financiers can then support for rapid expansion and dissemination. The risk is 
that the only solutions sought are those that can ultimately see a financial return, or at least 
can become self-sustaining (i.e. no longer requiring grant funding). Certain regions (those with 
higher “absorptive capacity”) and sectors (finance and microfinance, clean technologies) will be 
favoured over others. Market failures, e.g. in maternal healthcare and in failed states, may see 
funding sources eroded.
Recommendation
Foundations need to look critically at 
the portfolio of beneficiaries. Achieving 
scale and impact through market-
based mechanisms involves identifying 
opportunities where early stage funding 
(smart subsidy, grants, guarantees) has 
the potential to create the proof of concept 
Invest in research because it pays real 
dividends.
Achieving scale and impact through market-
based mechanisms involves identifying 
opportunities where early stage funding 
(smart subsidy, grants, guarantees) has the 
potential to create the proof of concept and 
market-ready enterprises that investors can 
then take to scale.
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and market-ready enterprises that investors can then take to scale. Conditions that contribute to 
the success of scalable models include favouring demand-led technologies that can be rapidly 
expanded and disseminated in regions that display high absorptive capacity (what the Rockefeller 
Foundation calls market dynamism). However, a critical review of the portfolio should address 
questions of balance and the applicability of market-based solutions to identified needs, seeing 
them as one of a number of options alongside more conventional strategic grant giving. 
Lesson five – Adopting high engagement means higher resource requirements
Foundations engaging with VP principles are adopting more inventive and diverse approaches 
to providing SPOs and partners with resources. High engagement and non-financial support is 
highly valued, in some instances more than financial contribution. Engagement devices used by 
foundations range from taking a seat on the board of partner organisations to in-house incubation 
and programme management. Alternatives to grant-giving and impact investment, such as 
capacity building field expertise and supporting public-private partnerships, widen the range of 
options available to foundations but require specialist knowledge and hands-on management. 
Providing deep expertise, whether of a technical or commercial nature, has obliged foundations 
to develop deeper specialist knowledge in issues and sectors (e.g. climate change, agriculture, 
microfinance). High engagement also requires more contact time, and foundations have seen 
their staff numbers swell to accommodate the increased demand. 
Recommendation
High engagement strategies require more human resources. This may be bought in from 
outside or developed internally, as the Emirates Foundation has sought to do. The best choice 
will reflect the foundation’s objectives and culture. Capabilities will need to include commercial 
and business management skills as well as financial knowledge. Familiarity with consultancy 
skills, such as facilitating strategy and change is also beneficial. Management should anticipate 
considerably greater time spent in the field for themselves and their staff. 
Headcount in organisations is often 
associated with cost, and so increasing 
staff numbers can be seen by boards 
as a cost rather than an investment. 
Boards need to buy into the concept of 
widening the resource pool the foundation 
makes available to SPOs and partners, from funding alone to capability provision and capacity 
building. This requires a reframing of the foundation’s “value” to partners by senior managers, 
from financial contribution alone to a balanced portfolio of financial and non-financial resources. 
Capturing indicators that account fully for non-financial contributions will substantiate the case 
for implementing such changes. 
Lesson six – Being adaptive and staying close to your partners
Foundations stressed the importance of staying agile and being able to move swiftly as 
needs emerge. In particular the ability to switch direction to alternative funding instruments and 
packages for SPOs was considered vital, especially when partnering with fast-moving social 
enterprises in developing markets. Being more agile was associated with a more entrepreneurial 
culture and mindset, and with less bureaucratic operations. 
Central to the model is a common belief in 
the power of markets to reach the poorest 
of the poor.
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Recommendation 
Transitioning to a venture philanthropy 
model may well require the dismantling of 
long-established processes and protocols 
in order to become more responsive to 
SPO needs and to be more adaptive. This 
may include potential sacred cows such 
as how SPOs are identified, how opportunities are screened (the shift from inviting proposals 
to proactively seeking partners), how funding is assigned and through which instruments. 
Responsibility and authority may need to be delegated to staff in the field. 
Lesson seven – Increasing risk tolerance, long-term orientation and patient capital
The deployment of foundation capital to social enterprise start-ups and to support innovative 
business models to achieve proof of concept requires a willingness to accept higher levels of risk 
and find novel methods to de-risk initiatives. Lengthier funding periods than those associated with 
venture capital or mainstream investment, the so-called “patient capital”* investment, provide the 
security and stability necessary for social enterprises to become commercially investment-ready. 
Inevitably, the potential for failure is higher in these circumstances and for those who come from 
environments less tolerant of failure this can be challenging. Being conscious of personal as well 
as organisational risk appetite is important. 
Recommendation
Foundations are seen to have both a 
privilege and responsibility to effectively 
place high risk capital, and therefore need 
to acknowledge their real, as opposed to 
stated, tolerance of risk and failure and 
explore the assumptions inherent in their 
portfolio. Reframing failure as learning and 
instigating regular evaluation can help 
address cultural antipathy to risk and surface risk mitigation strategies. Identifying where low 
risk tolerance may be preventing engagement with longer-term development issues and more 
complex solutions will also make visible areas currently underserved in the portfolio. Moreover, 
the dynamic nature of risk management means that as risk is managed down new opportunities 
will emerge. 
Lesson eight – Planning the divorce with the wedding or risk going native
One of the key risks associated with high engagement strategies was the difficulty in exiting a 
partnership once it was underway. In some cases, there was strong interdependence, relational 
ties, and incentive alignment between the foundations and the partners. Although this is clearly 
helpful to ensure common purpose and mutual success, it also makes disassociation harder. 
Shell Foundation likened their relationship to Envirofit to a “joint venture” or even a marriage. So 
whilst the long-term intention was to exit the partnership, a clear strategy for doing so had not yet 
been identified. Other foundations showed similar intention to exit without specific plans. 
 
Transitioning to a venture philanthropy 
model may well require the dismantling of 
long-established processes and protocols 
in order to become more responsive to SPO 
needs and to be more adaptive.
Foundations are seen to have both a 
privilege and responsibility to effectively 
place high risk capital, and therefore need 
to acknowledge their real, as opposed to 
stated, tolerance of risk and failure and 
explore the assumptions inherent in their 
portfolio.
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VP is markedly different from VC in this respect. Whilst superficially the relationships look 
similar, the longer period of partnership (7-10 years rather 2-3) and the shared values of social 
benefit create more personal ties. Such ties may be more or less discussable amongst the 
partners and they may not even be aware of the dynamic. But it can have profound implications 
in continuing relationships past the point of greatest utility, even tying up high risk capital when 
impact investors should be picking up the funding baton. 
Recommendation
The high engagement approach produces real dilemmas for foundations looking to add non-
financial value to their partners and collaborate with them. Whilst the concept of the “pet project” 
is by no means unique to venture philanthropy, the blurring of organisational boundaries that 
comes with the practice, particularly in collaboratively tackling near intractable issues over many 
years, makes the challenge of shifting funds and attention elsewhere more overt and the risk of 
“going native” (becoming one of the team) more inevitable. 
 Remaining conscious of these issues and the potential to go native is needed and, along with 
the regular strategic review recommended above, enables the continual monitoring of where 
funds and resources are directed and whether support should continue. 
Lesson nine – Working with other development actors
The foundations interviewed have focused very few of their restructured resources in engaging 
with parties active in the international policy debate on development, such as with the Post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Rockefeller Foundation, which was more active 
in the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals, sustains involvement but admits it is 
reduced since the new president’s arrival. In general terms, the process of engaging in high-level 
policy dialogue with multilateral and bilateral development institutions is viewed as bureaucratic 
and time consuming for foundations, running counter to both the limited resources at their 
disposal and their desire to create tangible impact. Whilst there was support for the Post-2015 
SDGs, none of the foundations were actively attempting to influence their priorities. 
It was noted, however, that as philanthropy and private investment become more important 
to the ODA agenda, the representation of foundations’ voice at policy level will become more 
crucial. Impact investing, new products such as social impact bonds and other non-conventional 
funding vehicles for development are driving ODA’s interest in accessing philanthropic capital 
and in how foundations deploy their funds and invest their endowment monies. 
Likewise, as foundations increasingly act to achieve impact at scale and to influence at policy 
level, they can expect increased scrutiny from governments, NGOs and civil society opinion-
shapers, all of whom will demand increasing transparency and openness. 
Recommendation
With higher levels of impact comes 
higher visibility and the expectation that 
foundations’ influence will be accompanied 
by efforts to be more accountable publicly. 
Just as various business sectors have had 
to become more transparent in their dealings in order to maintain a license to operate, so too 
will philanthropy. Maintaining a “seat at the table” and relevance, particularly in the development 
arena, also means taking an active position in the development debate, being willing to collaborate 
As philanthropy and private investment 
become more important to the ODA agenda, 
the representation of foundations’ voice at 
policy level will become more crucial.
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and subordinate individual foundation goals for collective societal and multi-party ones. All these 
represent significant shifts in current preferences and are best achieved through cross-sector 
collaboration. 
Lesson ten – Learning and collaborating with peers
The foundations participating in netFWD are aware of a need in the philanthropic sector for 
greater co-operation with peers, with more focus on learning, and on generating and sharing new 
insight. Co-operation by foundations was noted as a challenge for the sector, whether with peers 
or more broadly in the official aid arena. Perceived obstacles to co-operation include established 
cultures of high autonomy and the tendency to follow founders’ interests. There has been little 
willingness historically to subordinate brand and individual strategy to the pursuit of a common 
goal with peers. Now, however, the unprecedented scale and complexity of the development 
issues to be addressed requires collaborative action that overcomes individualism.
Networks such as netFWD, GIIN and EVPA have sprung up to meet the growing need for 
foundations and impact investors to share experience and learning, and to co-design means to 
address developmental, social and environmental challenges. These fora provide much needed 
opportunities to share discoveries and learning from the field, to apply insight from one sector to 
another and to attract funds and partnerships to where they are needed most. They also promote 
the cause of avoiding an unnecessary duplication of effort. 
Recommendation
Participation in networks and associations, particularly for foundations seeking to apply a 
VP model for development, will provide a much needed forum to explore experiences and learn 
strategies for change, at a pace necessary to meet shifting development demands. Further, taking 
a structured approach to learning, using 
processes like Action Research and multi-
stakeholder engagement techniques, as 
well as embedding learning cycles into 
monitoring and evaluation processes, 
will help not only the foundation itself to 
engage with and embed transformational change, but can also bring SPOs and others along on 
the journey. Ultimately, for the foundation to become successful at achieving impact at scale, it 
must learn to work effectively with and through others, become more transparent and aligned in 
the way it discloses and shares successes and failures with the sector.
The unprecedented scale and complexity 
of the development issues to be addressed 
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The scope of this report, reflecting the 
scope of the foundations participating, 
has been ambitious. It has attempted to: 
represent the current discourse on what 
constitutes venture philanthropy in the 
field of development and its direction 
of travel; set out the organisational 
challenges for foundations who might 
adopt the principles or even a variation of 
the VP model and provide lessons from the experience of a small number who are already on the 
journey; and explore the merits of the model in terms of the impact that can be achieved. 
The study finds that Venture Philanthropy for foundations working in development does not 
constitute a coherent, easily defined operating model or strategic approach. Rather it has become 
more of a blanket term, an expression of a more purpose-, results- and responsibility- driven 
worldview. It incorporates a diverse set of principles aimed at increasing the reach, scale and 
social benefit of foundation resources. Such principles include much closer “high engagement” 
relationships between foundation and social purpose organisations, more strategic and targeted 
funding choices based on research and evidence building, a more encompassing view of 
foundation resources and a willingness to partner based on potential for results and scale rather 
than structural or constitutional type. 
As such, the challenges in adopting the VP model are not inconsequential. The capabilities 
required to undertake more complex strategic modelling, engage more closely with stakeholders 
and build coalitions, develop management, technical and financial capacity in SPOs, acquire and 
deploy financial and non-financial resources, evaluate outcomes and achieve efficiencies, may 
be only partially present or even entirely lacking in the foundation at the outset. The inclusion 
of more commercial and enterprise strategies in the foundation portfolio, especially with for-
profit social enterprises, may raise cultural and ideological as well as constitutional concerns. 
An honest appraisal of the current “state of play” before embarking on adopting the model, to 
identify strengths to leverage and barriers to overcome, is a prerequisite in deciding if it is suitable 
and choosing where to start. 
The experience of the participating foundations, however, is that taking such a transformational 
journey is worthwhile. Although verifiable comparative field data is limited at present, foundation 
staff point to a variety of signals to showcase the value of the approach in engaging other 
actors to achieve leverage: attraction of more mainstream capital to development and maturing 
of commercially investible enterprises, involvement of non-development focused actors in 
addressing social issues (e.g. involving the banks in youth education for financial literacy) and the 
leveraging of tried-and-tested commercial techniques (e.g. distribution channels) to scale social 
solutions. At a much more personal level too, foundation staff also expressed a greater sense of 
fulfilment from taking a more hands-on and responsible attitude to their work. 
The study has raised a number of questions and areas for potential further research. Most 
critically, it highlights the need for greater inquiry, collaboration and co-learning both between 
foundations themselves and between foundations and other groups such as impact investors, 
commercial enterprise and the official aid community. The potential to leverage the “highest risk 
capital in the world” is already considerable, but becomes far more so when economies of scale 
Venture Philanthropy for foundations 
working in development does not constitute 
a coherent, easily defined operating model 
or strategic approach. Rather it has become 
more of a blanket term, an expression of a 
more purpose-, results- and responsibility- 
driven worldview.
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and the timely sharing of learning for continuous improvement are achieved. Further research to 
uncover good practice examples of cross-sector collaboration (e.g. government, philanthropy, 
business, finance), such as with vertical funds, which draw out applicable and replicable lessons 
will help move the philanthropic sector forward. This would encourage a deeper appreciation of 
the goals of such diverse actors, of the very different languages and frames of reference they 
use (business and finance versus policy and development). It would ultimately enable dialogue 
across them in ways that overcome some of the suspicions and unhelpful assumptions that 
persist. In the meantime, the continued pursuit of “impact” in philanthropy and participation in 
networks will likely further accountability, transparency and co-learning as well as encourage 
more measureable data collation and evaluation in foundations. 
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A participatory process concerned with developing practical knowledge in 
the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes (…) It seeks to bring together 
action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in 
the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people. 




Poorest socio-economic group globally. Typified as those living below a 
specified income threshold, e.g. USD 2 a day (Prahalad and Hart, 1998, 
updated to USD 2.50 a day (www.wikipedia.org). Also defined more widely 
(e.g. IFC) to include not only lack of money but also lack of access to basic 
goods, services, and income generation opportunities. 
De-risking The process of reducing or lowering risk. In practice this requires an 
understanding of risk measurement, risk appetite, the assessment of 
acceptable levels of risk, and financial and non-financial risk mitigation 
approaches, including hedging. (Source: authors, from interviews)
Enterprise 
philanthropy
The appropriate application of the disciplines, principles and thinking from 




Investments intended to generate social and environmental impact beyond 
financial return. (Source: The Rockefeller Foundation and J.P. Morgan 2010)
Inclusive 
business
Inclusive business is a private sector approach to providing goods, services, 
and livelihoods on a commercially viable basis to people at the base of 
the pyramid by incorporating them in the value chain of the core business 
as suppliers, distributors, retailers, and/or customers. Inclusive business 
is found across regions and sectors, including telecommunications, 
infrastructure, agribusiness, retail, distribution, affordable housing, health, 




A set of quantifiable measures that a company or industry uses to gauge or 




Management by objectives applied to programme or project design, 
monitoring and evaluation. The approach consists of four steps: 
(1) establishing objectives, (2) establishing cause-and-effect relationships 
(causal linkages) among activities, inputs, outputs, and objectives, 
(3) identifying assumptions underlying the causal linkages, and (4) identifying 





The DAC defines ODA as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC 
List of ODA Recipients which are:
i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by 
their executive agencies; and
ii. each transaction of which:
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 
25%(calculated at a rate of discount of 10%).”
ODA is the basic financial support used to develop the building blocks of 
nations, from healthcare and education services, to building infrastructure. 
Once these are firmly in place, nations can typically start to attract or develop 
other sources of development finance, as they move up the income scale. 
ODA can flow directly from a donor to a recipient country (bilateral ODA) or 
be provided via a multilateral agency (multilateral ODA). (Source: OECD DAC)




Programme-related investments (PRIs) are investments made by 
foundations to support charitable activities that involve the potential return 
of capital within an established time frame. PRIs include financing methods 
commonly associated with banks or other private investors, such as loans, 
loan guarantees, linked deposits, and even equity investments in charitable 




Use of substitute indicators that are generally more tangible, easily defined 
and measureable to function in place of those which are harder to delineate, 
quantify and collect data on; e.g. number of city urban resilience strategies 
as proxy measure for extent of engagement and activity on urban resilience 
across multiple stakeholder groups. (Source: authors, from interviews) 
Social 
enterprise
Any private activity conducted in the public interest, organised with an 
entrepreneurial strategy but whose main purpose is not the maximisation 
of profit but the attainment of certain economic and social goals, and which 
has a capacity of bringing innovative solutions to the problems of social 
exclusion and unemployment. (Source: OECD, Social enterprises, 1999)
Social 
investment
Social investment provides capital which gives social sector organisations 
the capacity to deliver returns. These may be social, financial or both. This 
investment can be used towards revenue funding for output or outcomes or 
capital investment that builds long-term capacity to achieve a social mission. 
Social investment is repayable, often with interest but also at below market 





The EVPA uses the term SPO to show that venture philanthropists may fund 
a range of organisational types, from charities and non-profit organisations 
through to socially driven and even purely commercial businesses. What 
unites these organisations is their individual or collective contribution to 
positive social and/or environmental impact rather than their legal status or 
the generation of profit. (Source: authors, derived from EVPA)
Systems 
thinking
Systems thinking is a way of thinking about, and a language for describing 
and understanding, the forces and interrelationships that shape the 
behaviour of systems. This discipline helps us to see how to change systems 
more effectively, and to act more in tune with the natural processes of the 
natural and economic world. (Source: Senge, 1990)
Theory of 
change
Methodology to review philosophy, values and underlying assumptions 
associated with desired change outcomes, and to map out and co-ordinate 




Venture philanthropy is an entrepreneurial and cross-sector approach to 
philanthropy that combines a variety of financial and non-financial resources 
to identify, analyse, co-ordinate and support self-sustaining, systemic and 
scalable solutions to development challenges for greatest impact. (Source: 
authors, from interviews)
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“You can’t just write cheques for USD $50 m without 
giving some thought to accountability, impact, 
where the money is going. You have to think about 
what’s the net asset value of what you’re creating?” 
Clare Woodcraft, CEO
Emirates Foundation is an independent foundation 
established by the Government of the Emirate 
of Abu Dhabi to facilitate public-private funded 
initiatives to improve the welfare of people across 
the UAE. Following a strategic review conducted 
on arrival of the new CEO, Clare Woodcraft, in 
2011 the foundation was remodelled from short-
term grant-making across multiple sectors to focus 
exclusively on youth development in UAE. The new 
direction aligns more closely to the Government’s 
Economic Vision 2030, with priorities to promote 
Emiritisation, engage young people and develop the 
skills necessary, across science and technology, to 
establish a strong knowledge economy. 
Emirates Foundation has taken an operational 
approach, building on existing “programme 
nuggets” developed in the margins of the old 
operating model. It already had 28 000 young 
people in its database, many of whom had attended 
short educational programmes. Creating a handful 
of programmes with capacity to scale, they 
have invested in capability building of staff, new 
systems and significant restructuring to facilitate 
their growth. The current portfolio includes social 
inclusion, volunteering, leadership skills and 
emergency aid skills development, and now financial 
literacy. The foundation runs the programmes 
relatively independently, with some limited co-
operation between them. The intention is that each 
programme follows the Shell Foundation model of 
“incubate, pilot, scale-up and spin-off”, ultimately 
becoming self-sufficient in terms of financing and 
management. Foundation staff are the first to 
admit, however, that self-sufficiency is more easily 
achieved for programmes with high demand, those 
seen to benefit participants with skills, knowledge 
and access to networks, rather than those that 
are more supply-driven, such as teacher-assistant 
training for social inclusion, raising internal debate 
around innovative funding models. 
Once the new strategic focus was established, the 
foundation conducted a year-long research effort 
to decide where to focus its resources, with input 
from stakeholders including government actors, 
representatives of the education sector, the private 
sector and social enterprise to identify the most 
pressing issues. Financial literacy (FL) was one of 
these and has now become a flagship programme. 
Foundation staff formed a working group including 
representatives of government, universities, banks, 
the Central Bank and credit agencies. Through 
a series of workshops, the group designed an 
educational programme on financial literacy with 
outreach to young people via a bus fitted out with 
iPads, pamphlets, videos, and teaching areas that 
will tour schools and universities. The working 
group is also seeking to change the institutions 
that have allowed youth debt to become a problem 
in the first place, addressing credit availability 
in banks, advertising and media messages. The 
approach reflects a more systemic mindset and a 
collaborative partnering approach that has been 
established with the new operating model. 
Assessing impact 
Emirates Foundation are keen to demonstrate 
the impact of their programmes but recognise 
the challenge of connecting inputs – attendance 
on programmes, education – with outcomes 
and impact such as levels of social inclusion and 
financial literacy. Since the restructuring, they have 
a dedicated monitoring and evaluation team and 
are tracking a number of quantitative indicators at 
programme and foundation levels, including number 
of attendees on programmes and active alumni. 
The production in 2013 of a “logical framework” to 
connect their theory of change to a small number of 
metrics is intended to produce more sophisticated 
EMIRATES FOunDATIOn FOR 
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measures of outcome and impact, including the 
value of the social benefit provided. 
“For example, if our volunteers spend 30 000 hours 
in total volunteering, then what’s the social value we 
are creating there? 
Clare Woodcraft, CEO
The FL programme is a new programme and, 
therefore, as yet has limited capacity to demonstrate 
impact in quantifiable and meaningful terms. The 
FL team set a performance target of 3000 young 
people to have visited the bus in the first year. In 
the first week, over 13 000 passed through, picking 
up information and speaking to advisors. Whilst the 
response was overwhelming for Emirates Foundation 
and confirmed that they were addressing a social 
need, the real impact of the programme can only 
be determined long-term as incidence and scale of 
youth debt is charted and tracked. 
In the short to medium term, the increased media 
coverage and on-going interaction with financial 
institutions to alter their credit products will provide 
more proxy evidence of impact as and when it 
occurs. Likewise, the crowding-in of additional 
financial and non-financial (specialist advisory) 
support from banks and other institutions evinces 
the value they are placing on the programme.
Qualitative evidence of systemic change through 
anecdotes is starting to emerge, including 
momentum towards collaboration between 
historically competitive institutions. 
“We told them we won’t use their logos, and it 
doesn’t matter where they come from – Mastercard, 
Visa, or whatever – that’s not what it’s about”. 
Badriah al Khouri, Head of Programme
In addition to the bus, the FL team has now been 
asked to help reform the secondary education 
curriculum. Levels of interest from other institutions 
so far, including financial support from stakeholders, 
has been lower than anticipated, and Emirates 
Foundation are still driving the initiative. They note 
that for the programme to scale, ownership must 
become more distributed and the baton taken up 
by other actors. 
However, the FL programme, as with the portfolio in 
general, is intuitively taken to be delivering greater 
social benefit and impact at scale than the old 
model of restricted grant-funding.
“The fact we shifted from short-term grants to long-
term programmes was already going to help us 
add value… you cannot take 18 months to look at 
a fundamental social issue. It takes time. So that is 
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“We smelled success from the beginning. But how 
could we scale it? How to make it pay for itself? 
… We didn’t want to fall in the same traps of being 
a donor-led project… this needs to be seen as an 
investment not a hand-out. How do we get away 
from a subsidised base and get it into the market?” 
Dale Lewis, CEO Comaco
Dale Lewis, a career conservationist focused on 
wildlife conservation in Africa, led an initial research 
on the reasons why poachers kill wildlife (in this 
instance elephants), in collaboration with the World 
Conservation Society (WCS). For that purpose, he 
conducted a qualitative inquiry with poachers and 
communities living adjacent to national parks in 
Zambia. Lewis’s research revealed a clear causal link 
between low food security in the local communities 
and poaching activities. Inadequate crop yields 
arising from poor farming methods, soil erosion 
and deterioration, vulnerability to erratic weather 
patterns and water scarcity, and lack of effective 
local economic institutions, has compelled farmers 
to resort to dangerous and illegal practices such as 
poaching to augment very poor incomes and feed 
families. Having found the link, Lewis conducted 
an experiment with WCS funding, providing a 
community with “artificial food security” and 
comparing the rates of snaring to a control group 
over a 12 month period. The comparison groups 
showed “a phenomenal difference” [Lewis]. With 
this data, Lewis went to the World Food Programme 
which agreed to co-finance provision of seed and 
support to take the experiment further. Within 
two years, Lewis and a growing team had a clear 
proof of concept and were providing outreach and 
capacity building on conservation farming methods 
that were increasing yields, whilst simultaneously 
restoring local ecosystem health. In addition, the 
team determined that extending the value chain and 
converting commodities into value-added products 
(e.g. from peanuts to peanut butter) would, if 
a market was made available, further increase 
farmers’ income. 
“Out of that came a proposal. Let’s do it ourselves 
because no-one else is doing it. Let’s just come 
together and form a company, find finance, make 
a special brand. We’re not motivated by the same 
old conventional methods, but from where farmers 
can get their surplus into good value high quality 
products that people will buy. Money will come 
back. It was a real Shangri-La moment romantic 
idealised vision. I’m sure everyone thought we 
were completely wacko. Except us. We took it very 
seriously indeed”.
Dale Lewis, CEO Comaco
Despite having secured additional funding from 
the Norwegian Government, to get to scale, Lewis 
saw a need for significant further seed capital and 
sought alternative options more aligned to Comaco 
as a social enterprise. An introduction to Lundin 
Foundation followed. 
Lundin Foundation structure their investment 
portfolio based on a two-by-two matrix with axes 
of social impact and financial return. Preferable 
deals fall in the top right (high social impact, high 
financial return) or bottom right (high social impact, 
low financial return). The value of Lundin’s style of 
philanthropy to this sector, according to Stephen 
Nairne of Lundin Foundation, is that it is “fast, 
flexible, very innovative, can take early stage risk 
and provide fit for purpose capital structures – and 
that includes grants”. It provides the incubation 
and accelerator conditions that make enterprises 
“investment-ready”. 
Stephen Nairne discovered Comaco in 2008. He 
“saw the results and loved the model and wanted to 
meet” [Lewis]. Comaco met the Lundin Foundation 
criteria, being based in sub-Saharan Africa, having 
the potential to be a scalable social enterprise with 
requisite capability and proof of concept. It had the 
potential to benefit from an enterprise philanthropy 
approach. 
Direct support includes grants for capital and soft 
loans including USD 1 m in revolving inventory 
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finance loans in 2011.9 Subsidy has gradually been 
reduced, while debt and other tailored financing 
has increased. Stephen Nairne holds a non-
executive directorship at Comaco and acts as an 
intermediary between the Comaco Board and the 
Lundin Foundation Board. Engagement in practice 
may be ad hoc phone calls between Nairne and 
Lewis (and the team) to provide business advice, 
discuss milestones and develop capability for 
example around cash flow management or financial 
modelling. 
Asked to characterise the relationship between 
Comaco and Lundin Foundation, Lewis tellingly 
answers from the perspective of the relationship 
between himself and Stephen Nairne.
“We’re the best of friends… Stephen is hugely 
bright, incredibly patient. In his heart and mind 
when he sees something that he thinks is the right 
approach and the right people he’ll stick by you 
through thick and thick! With a company like ours 
that has definitely seen some bumps in the road 
he hasn’t been deterred and keeps us absolutely 
accountable and on track.”
Dale Lewis, CEO Comaco
Comaco has a monitoring and evaluation unit in 
Lusaka and a comprehensive evaluation framework. 
Results from on-going monitoring are posted on the 
itswild.org website for public scrutiny. Indicators 
tracked and published include, for example, the 
percentage difference in yield between use of 
conservation farming (CF) methods and non-CF 
methods (in 2006 CF methods showed a 15% 
improvement over non-CF methods).10 Third party 
data is gathered to support and validate the team’s 
findings. These include aerial and satellite imagery 
from Virginia Tech University with analysis focused 
on tree cutting, fires and watershed impact from 
farming (PNAS, 2011). 
Through peer-reviewed published research, Lewis 
and Comaco have made substantiated arguments 
for their conservation farming methods and 
enterprise-based market-building model. It has 
now been recognised in at least one peer-reviewed 
journal (PNAS) for its use of an “innovative business 
model … that has resulted in wildlife populations 
stabilising and rebounding in areas once ravaged by 
poaching. In addition, local people – including some 
of the world’s poorest farmers – are now benefitting 
from higher crop yields and improved livelihoods”.11
Lundin Foundation’s role as a primary funder, 
exhibits a high degree of engagement with Comaco 
that includes flexible and responsive tailored 
funding, capacity building and operational support 
over an extended multi-year period (with no current 
plans to exit), attraction of other funders to realise 
plans for scale and sustainability, and empirically 
grounded performance management. Further the 
case demonstrates impact at (increasing) scale 
across a number of social and environmental 
indicators (PNAS, 2011). Making substantiated 
claims for the value added of Lundin Foundation’s 
involvement and the enterprise philanthropy 
approach they apply is not straightforward. 
Immediate counterfactual evidence, e.g. that 
Comaco’s approach could scale without such 
investment and support, is not available. Qualitative 
data from the interviews however suggest the value-
added has been considerable. 
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“Communities around the world need better 
weapons — new tools, techniques, and strategies 
— if they hope to tame the three-headed hydra of 
climate risk, poverty, and precipitous urbanisation. 
Each successive day we do not act brings us — and 
them — closer to catastrophe.”
Judith Rodin, CEO 
Press Release, January 2009
The Rockefeller Foundation, a US based grant-
making foundation, celebrates its centenary in 2013. 
Its mission, to improve the welfare of humanity, 
has remained unchanged in that time. In 2011, its 
endowment was worth USD 3.5 bn and it paid out 
USD 142 m to grants and direct charitable activities 
(Annual Report, 2011). 
In 2005, a new CEO, Judith Rodin, was appointed, 
marking a strategic turn for the foundation 
towards (or in Rodin’s terms back to) “scientific 
philanthropy”, that is focused on leveraging the 
funds and expertise available to achieve impact at 
scale (The Economist, Dec 2006). Since her arrival, 
considerable restructuring and capability building 
has occurred, with the formation of a specialist 
“searching and scanning” function to apply rigorous 
scientific methods to researching social and 
environmental trends. Effective evaluation has also 
been a priority and the evaluation team engages with 
partners leading the assessment field in developing 
regions to develop best practice methodologies. 
One of the early flagship initiatives associated with 
the new philanthropic model is the Asian Cities 
Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN). 
A nine-year programme covering ten cities across 
India, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam, it was 
launched in 2008, when climate change adaptation 
was still an under-acknowledged concern, with a 
USD 42 m grant from The Rockefeller Foundation. Its 
published aims are to “catalyse attention, funding, 
and action” in the areas of experimentation and 
testing of local approaches to urban climate change 
resilience (UCCR) for institutions serving poor 
and vulnerable communities, demonstrating and 
disseminating knowledge about approaches and 
awareness-raising among funders, practitioners, 
policy makers and business to promote investment. 
Asia was initially chosen over Africa for the 
programme, despite similar issues of rapid 
urbanisation and population growth, as it was seen 
generally to have higher absorptive capacity, a 
more stable economic base and market dynamism, 
i.e. it had the capacity, though nascent, to engage 
with and ultimately own responsibility for, the 
development of adaptation strategies. Five years on 
the programme is being rolled out to other regions 
globally, with Africa a priority. 
Despite being a non-operational foundation (Heather 
Grady, in interview), ACCCRN has involved a hands-
on approach with foundation staff establishing 
the office. Two full-time staff are supported by 
numerous part-time foundation staff. The team’s 
activities, described by Anna Brown, Associate 
Director responsible for leading ACCCRN, include 
co-ordination and “bridging” between disciplines 
such as climate science, urban planners and 
financial institutions; influencing actors, especially 
donors, to attract additional funding; convening 
stakeholders and building networks, including with 
governments and the private sector; and financing 
on-going research and thought leadership, 
including with international firms such as Arup and 
ISET. Support to social enterprises prototyping 
solutions to adaptation problems, such as reducing 
waste treatment and infrastructure vulnerabilities 
to extreme weather events, is also in the portfolio. 
Enterprise is recognised as a central, but not the 
only, mechanism for effecting impact at scale. 
“We have a role to build understanding, education 
and outreach around what UCCR is and getting 
buy in to it. It’s about brokering and linking other 
donors with our partners. To enable scale-up with 
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the resources we have so we can punch above our 
weight… we can help to be a voice on this issue”. 
Anna Brown, VP ACCCRN 
Assessing impact 
“We’re in this for a set period of time and then 
we’re out and climate change isn’t going away. The 
importance of growing institutional capacity and 
ownership over this issue across diverse institutions 
is critical to have lasting impact.”
Anna Brown, VP ACCCRN 
Heather Grady describes the foundation’s ambition 
as wanting “to make a paradigm shift in a decade”. 
Venture philanthropy is not a term used actively in 
the foundation, though many of the principles are 
shared. The ACCCRN programme is considered 
its first foray into proactive systems change of this 
nature and it has produced a wealth of learning 
applicable to other programmes, according to the 
foundation staff interviewed, including on matters 
of ownership (who takes primary responsibility) 
and evaluating impact in incredibly complex social 
systems. 
A mid-term formative evaluation for ACCCRN was 
conducted by a third party, Verulam Associates, 
and published in April 2011. It confirmed that each 
of the ten participating cities has developed climate 
resilience strategies (CRSs) and 36 grants have 
been made to 18 grantees to further knowledge 
acquisition and dissemination. The report also 
identified areas for development, including the need 
for more lateral knowledge sharing and co-learning 
between cities. The ACCCRN core team were still 
acting as too much of a hub in a hub-and-spoke 
model of communication and leadership. ACCCRN 
took this learning on board, says Paul Thornton, 
author of the report, and in the last two years peer-
to-peer networks have strengthened considerably.
The network has now attracted over USD 200 m (to 
2013) in direct funding from donors including UK’s 
Department for International Development and KfW 
(German Development Bank) with additional funds 
expected. The Rockefeller Foundation is now, as 
the programme heads towards conclusion in 2015, 
looking to hand over increasing responsibility for 
leadership to state representatives and use its 
name and reputation to crowd-in further financial 
resources, particularly from private sector and 
impact investors. A summative evaluation will be 
completed in 2016. 
Internal performance indicators are primarily tracked 
at the output and outcome level, including: capacity 
building amongst “city partners”; technologies 
developed and owned by city partners; extent of 
lessons shared from reflection on practice. Impact 
is recognised as impossible to attribute directly 
but degree of city-level engagement with UCCR is 
seen as demonstrative of broad success with the 
programme.
“Impact is above the accountability line – we’ll 
measure and look and assess and hope we were a 
significant contributor but we can’t know for sure”.
Nancy Macpherson, VP Evaluation 
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“There are many examples where organisations 
have given products away for free. And there is 
certainly a time for this type of intervention, in post-
conflict or disaster relief situations for example. 
However, the world is beginning to realise that 
behind high-quality, beneficial products such as 
clean technology cookstoves, there needs to be a 
self-sustaining social enterprise.”
Ron Bills CEO and Chairman, Envirofit
One of Shell Foundation’s six core programmes, 
the Envirofit programme seeks to address the 
major social and environmental problems that arise 
from over 3 billion people in developing countries 
burning biomass on traditional and inefficient 
stoves. The WHO reports that the resultant indoor 
air pollution (IAP) is the cause of diseases such 
as acute lower respiratory infections, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease and lung cancer, 
and is responsible for 3.5 m deaths a year. It is 
thought to be the biggest cause of death in children 
under five (Bruce et al., 2002). Inefficient cooking 
is also extremely expensive: raising fuel costs for 
low-income families (both financially and in some 
countries in time spent gathering wood), while the 
black carbon produced is also a major contributor 
to climate change.
In line with its mission, since 2002 Shell Foundation 
has sought to catalyse an enterprise-based solution 
to this issue through the development of a clean cook 
stoves sector (cook stoves with lower emissions 
and fuel use). After five years of pilots with nine 
NGO partners across seven countries (at the cost 
of just over USD 15 m) to explore new technologies, 
business models and fuel types, Shell Foundation 
concluded that a totally new enterprise structured 
for scale and with global ambitions was required. 
Compared to pilot partners, there was a need for 
new capability and new mindset. The partner had 
to be highly competent at designing new products 
for low-income communities and getting them to 
market, have a desire to achieve scale of impact at 
its core and display an entrepreneurial approach. 
Resilience and flexibility were also important due to 
an expectation that the business model would need 
constant adjustment. 
Envirofit International based out of Colorado State 
University, had no experience of cook stoves 
but did have many of the attributes described 
above. Serial entrepreneur Ron Bills applied these 
principles to develop a two-stroke engine retrofit kit 
business in the Philippines that reduced fuel use by 
30% and emissions by 70%. A meeting between 
Ron Bills and Kurt Hoffman at Shell Foundation in 
2007 immediately highlighted synergies between 
the two organisations. This led to a long-term 
strategic partnership between the organisations to 
design, produce and sell high-quality, high-volume 
cookstoves in emerging markets around the world. 
Over the following six years Shell Foundation has 
provided a total of USD 17.5 m in grants (released 
in staged payments on the achievement of agreed 
milestones) and a loan guarantee of USD 1.5 m. 
Direct support includes: core funding to cover 
operations and build capacity; participation in the 
day to day operational decisions of the business 
as part of the management team; strategic and 
marketing support; joint commissioning of in-depth 
customer research; formal review of Envirofit’s 
performance on a quarterly basis through planning 
meetings; leveraging links with Royal Dutch 
Shell to access networks and business tools; 
business development assistance to create new 
B2B distribution partnerships; support to register 
and trade carbon savings; funding research and 
development to create durable, affordable, high 
performance products and to assess the best 
approaches to mass production; and a presence 
on the Envirofit Board of Trustees.
Indirect support includes work across the 
cookstove value chain to tackle major market 
barriers to scale, for example: the implementation 
of local and national IAP awareness-raising 
campaigns to foster market demand; innovative 
partnerships with microfinance institutions and 
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NGOs to provide consumer finance and improve 
affordability; establishing a range of new “last 
mile” distribution channels to reach under-served 
customers in remote areas, including the creation 
of Dharma Life, a specialist social enterprise that 
markets social-impact products across rural India; 
funding Berkeley Air Monitoring Group to conduct 
independent monitoring of stove performance in the 
field; innovating new carbon financing partnerships 
to improve the viability of clean energy products 
and services; and co-founding the Global Alliance 
for Clean Cookstoves with the United Nations 
Foundation in 2010 to stimulate sector-level interest, 
legitimacy, and competition. 
Assessing impact
Envirofit have now sold over 700 000 biomass 
cookstoves across India, Africa and Latin America. 
They have a range of products tailored to different 
consumer needs and desires – with the least 
expensive wood stove starting at approximately 
USD 15 and sold with a five-year warranty. 
Extensive testing, both in Colorado State University 
labs and in the field through Berkley Air Monitoring 
Group, show that each stove significantly reduces 
emissions, cooking time and fuel usage, with 
results varying depending on stove type, quality of 
biomass, kitchen ventilation and the way the stove 
is used.
The indicators used to assess the effectiveness 
of the partnership vary according to the type of 
decision the information is intended to inform. 
For example, emphasis is placed on product 
performance, product costs, sales volumes and 
market penetration for the partner to make day-
to-day operational and investment decisions. 
The Shell Foundation management team needs 
information to be aggregated to a level that makes 
the programme sufficiently comparable with other 
programmes in order to inform resource allocation 
decisions. The board of trustees requires directional 
information to show that the foundation is meeting 
its objectives and is on mission. Time has been 
spent developing defensible methodologies to 
make such comparisons available to derive social 
impact. 
At the systems level, data needs to be collected 
to develop an evidence base at the geographic, 
demographic and meta-level for stakeholders to 
determine the efficacy of clean cookstoves as a 
solution to the global problem of IAP and potentially 
climate change. 
To date the partnership with Envirofit is already a 
success based on Shell Foundation’s own definition 
of scale. The partner operates in multiple countries 
and regions, it is earning income derived from those 
markets and attracting funding (such as USD 3.5 m 
from Calvert Foundation) that matches or exceeds 
the grant contribution. The management team is 
also highly competent. 
It is however too early to tell if large-scale 
development outcomes will be achieved and, more 
likely, that global success will come from broader 
market development rather than from single cook 
stove producers. To this end, Shell Foundation 
is also supporting the development of the clean 
cookstoves sector as a whole, through a range of 
new partnerships to tackle market barriers such 
as affordability, consumer awareness and rural 
distribution; and by efforts to leverage investment 
and codify best practice at an industry-level 
through its work with the Global Alliance for Clean 
Cookstoves. Shell Foundation also sees it may 
have a role in grant funding future research and 
development into the next generation of cook 
stoves.
If Envirofit attracts capital from private equity 
in 2014, it will be testament to the robustness 
of the organisation, the market potential and 
Shell Foundation’s approach. At that point Shell 
Foundation intends to retain a position on the board 
to ensure the organisation remains focused on 
impact. 
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Notes
1. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190
2. Mobile Health refers to the use of mobile and smartphone technologies in the provision of healthcare.
3. www.effectivephilanthropy.org/index.php
4. The OECD has been asked to scope and size the market in a Global Social Impact Investment report to be 
published in the course of 2014.
5. See case study in Annex I.
6. Changing Our World, a fundraising and philanthropy consultancy. 
7. In front of the US Congress, and defined as “the imaginative pursuit of less conventional philanthropic purposes 
than those normally undertaken by established public charitable organisations” (Osberg, in Nicholls, 2006). 
8. http://iris.thegiin.org/iris-standards and www.pulsesoftware.co.uk
9. www.lundinfoundation.org/i/pdf/ppt/LundinFoundation_EMRC2011.pdf
10. Example taken from Comaco website: www.itswild.org/food-production
11.  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011. 
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